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Abstract 
In thi s thesis, I argue that we have no reason to accept the existence of a category of 
supererogatory moral goods: that is, good acts that carry no pressure to bring them 
about. Despite the counterintuitive nature and suspicious provenance of the concept, 
Supererogationism is the orthodoxy in Ethics, and I examine promising but 
unsuccessful responses to it by Peter Singer and K warne Gyekye. Responding in 
particular to David Heyd 's Supererogation ism - but also to J. O. Urmson, Susan 
Wolf, and Jonathan Dancy - I develop an account of the principle "Good implies 
Ought" that does not entail absurd over-obligation. I argue that this Anti-
Supererogationist model stands up to the four strongest arguments against such a 
position, and that it embraces a more accurate account of the relation between values 
and oughts than Supererogationists are capable of supplying. Finally, I sketch a 
detailed eudaimonist account of the principle umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - that our 
commitment to the good of others stems from our flourishing being caught up with 
theirs. 
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Chapter 1 
Supererogation and its Discontents 
Introduction 
Every so often, we hear actions described as "above and beyond the call of duty." 
This phrase is sufficiently familiar that we tend to assume we understand it; 
connotations are called forth of heroism or martyrdom, of sacrifice or substantial risk. 
Suffusing these associations is the idea that there is something good about such 
actions, something morally commendable. Charity, generosity, kindness, 
consideration, forgiveness, mercy, volunteering, and granting favours - though not as 
uncommon as heroism, these sorts of act are no less exemplary of going beyond duty. 
The term used to describe such acts is "Supererogation" (from the Latin supererogare 
"to payout more than is due") I. Supererogationists assert that any conception of 
ethics must recognise that such acts are simultaneously beyond duty (and thus, 
beyond moral requirement), and good. Indeed, Supererogationists such as David 
Heyd argue that being beyond duty makes such acts particularly good. As Jonathan 
Dancy notes however, 
Normally we would think that, as value rises, the change in degree of 
evaluative property is attended by a change in degree of deontic 
property; the more good one's action would do, the more one ought to 
choose it in preference to others. But if there are supererogatory 
actions, there can come a point where the value rises while it becomes 
less, rather than more true that one ought to do the action ... This 
already seems peculiar .. .' 
Here Supererogationists hold that "there is nothing paradoxical in a good and 
meritorious action being completely optional, even if it is morally better than 
altemative non-optional actions.'" If this strikes you, as it does me, as clearly 
paradoxical, you may share the Anti-Supererogationist worry that it seems strange to 
describe a realisable moral good, without a concomitant pressure to pursue it. This is 
the response from the "Good-Ought tie-up," which holds that the term "Good" 
implies "ought to do." Such an assumption seems no more or less coherent to our 
everyday understanding than going beyond duty - yet it excludes the possibility of 
1 David Heyd, entry on Supererogation, Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhjlQsophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supererogation/ 
2 In his Moral Reasons, 1993, Blackwell, p127. 
3 David Heyd, Supererogatjon" Its Status in Ethjcal Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pI6S. 
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exceeding our obligations, as it becomes intrinsic to calling an action (morally) good 
that we are obliged, ceteris paribus, to perform it. A second worry concerns the sort 
of behaviour engendered by a Supererogationist ethic. While Supererogationists allow 
scope for pursuing goods beyond explicit duties, the diluted normative pressure 
toward the Good suggested here seems to ring hollow. It seems that a society in wh ich 
people acknowledge a normative pressure to be generous and forgiving must be better 
than a society in which these are taken as optional. What is at stake in the debate over 
Supererogation is the extent to which the general good or the good of others can 
impinge on the agent ' s life and lifestyle. The outcome of the debate will dictate 
whether moral responsibility is best captured by a system in which we have "a right to 
moral relaxation,'" or by "an altruistically-freighted morality. '" 
In this thesis I argue that we have no reason to be Supererogationists, and good 
reason to be Anti-Supererogationists - that is , to deny that Supererogation is a 
coherent category at all. In the second chapter, I respond to the four strongest 
arguments for supererogation, sketching an Anti-Supererogationist account. In the 
third chapter, I examine the relation between values and moral oughts,' and show that 
the Supererogationist account of this relation is unnecessary, problematic, and under-
describes the source of normative force. In the fourth and final chapter, I provide a 
detailed account of how pursuing the good of others is necessary to our own good, 
such that the pressure toward the good of others is not at odds with our self-interest. 
Before doing so, I will sketch the grounds of contention in this introductory chapter. 
In this chapter, after outlining what supererogation ism is and what hangs on 
accepting or rejecting it, I will note two initial reasons to doubt the concept: that 
supererogation assumes all of ethics can be captured by Institutional Duties, and that 
the concept of supererogation originated as an ad hoc solution to a specific 
theological problem, which was abandoned by its original proponents centuries before 
being re-established in the secular context. Despite this, Supererogationists 
predominate in the philosophical literature. Before turning to my own response, I will 
briefly examine two ways not to defeat Supererogationism. 
~ Heyd, in Supererogation, p 174. 
5 Kwame Gyekye, in his Tradition and Modernity' Philosophical ReOectjoos on the African 
Experience, Oxford University Press, 1997. p67. 
61 will use the term "ought" rather than alternatives such as "duty" or "obligation" as these carry 
deontic connotations, and the question of whether all moral imperatives reduce to duties is precisely the 
issue. 
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What Supererogation Is 
Though the concept originated in Christian theology (more on this later), the 
contemporary secular debate on supererogation began with J. O. Urmson ' s paper 
Saints and Heroes. 7 Urmson argued that the conventional tripartite division of actions 
- forbidden, permissible, obligatory - assumed a parallel continuum of values 
(something like negative value, neutral value, positive value). Since such an 
assumption could not describe "Saintly" actions, which achieve great value, yet 
cannot be obligatory, Urmson argued that deontic and evaluative statements can come 
apart. It is important to note that Urmson's paper is not an argument for 
supererogation. It assumes that supererogation is coherent, and takes the existence of 
supererogatory acts as a premise. An argument for supererogation has developed from 
the ensuing critical response, framed as a response to the "Paradox of 
Supererogation.'" This paradox arises from the antithetic claims: 
I. Moral goods imply an obligation to perform them. 
and 
2. If all moral goods imply obligation, then we are obliged to perform 
every possible good, which is absurdly strong. 
The Supererogationist response to this paradox is to deny that all moral goods 
imply an obligation to perform them. Rather, they argue that ethical theories must 
recognise two categories of good act: the obligatory, and the supererogatory. Where 
the former is good, and as such required, the latter is good and optional. Some 
Supererogationists see special, additional merit in performing good acts when we are 
not strictly obliged to do so and argue that any moral theory must allow scope for 
such merit to be recognised. 
The Anti-Supererogationist response to the paradox accepts that Good implies 
Ought, and denies that this over-extends the moral agent. As such, they argue that any 
good act carries some obligation to perform it, and that ethical supererogation is 
incoherent. It follows from this that there can be a compelling moral pressure to be 
generous, forgiving, merciful, or self-sacrificing (to the point of heroism or 
martyrdom) iffthis is best. On such a model, failing to be heroic, forgiving etc., while 
' In Essays in Moral Philosophy, 1. A. Melden (ed), Univers ity of Washington Press, 1958. 
g http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supererogation/ The version I provide is not Heyd's, but captures the 
basic foml of the paradox. The very useful categorisation of responses to the paradox is also Hcyd's. 
aware that it is in fact best to be so, is a moral failing and seems to invite moral 
sanction. 
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A third position, Qualified Supererogation ism, accepts that Good implies Ought, 
but argues that it is qualified by other considerations, such that whole categories of act 
can be exempt from obligation. 
David Heyd provides both the most comprehensive history of the concept and 
what I take to be the most rigorous formulation of Supererogation ism in his 
Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory. He defines an act as supererogatory iff' 
1. It is neither obligatory nor forbidden. 
2. Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve sanction or criticism -
either formal or informal. 
3. It is morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) consequences and by 
virtue of its intrinsic value (being beyond duty). 
4. It is done voluntarily for the sake of someone else's good, and is thus 
meritorious. 
Heyd will be my chief antagonist, and I hope that a brief look at his paradigm cases 
will demonstrate more clearly what I take to be disturbing in asserting that a category 
like the one outlined above is coherent. Heyd argues that the omission ofany of the 
following acts cannot, by definition, be wrong: Saintly or Heroic se lf-sacrifice; 
beneficence (including charity, generosity, and gift-giving); granting favours; 
volunteering; forbearance: "when a person does not do something which he is morally 
entitled to do , like demanding less than his due, or not insisting on his rights""; and 
acts of pardon, forgiveness, and mercy. J J 
Confronted with this list, it seems to me that, while we would agree that it would 
be absurd to consider all such acts obligatory, we can also imagine instances of each 
sort in which omission would clearly be wrong. This suggests that something more 
complex than ruling something to be always/never obligatory is going on when we are 
confronted with moral imperatives and that exempting acts categorically from 
obligation is an indelicate approach to a nuanced situation. 
q Supereroeation. p 115. 
IOSupererolfatjon"p 152. 
II Heyd's detailed arguments for each of these paradigm cases is developed in Supererogation, pp142-
154. I will not be going into more detailed analysis of Hey d 's or any other list, as I am concerned with 
the concept of supererogation Simpliciter rather than allY speci fic formulation. I cite Hcyd' s merely as 
an example of the category Supererogationists aTe asserting exists. 
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Of course, supererogation is not an inescapable assumption when confronted with 
such acts. In addition to our common-sense suspicion, whole philosophical stances 
explicitly deny the coherence of supererogation . This is important to remember, as 
much contemporary Western discussion tends to work from the assumption that Anti-
Supererogationism is a hypothetical position that one is forced to adopt if one is 
insufficiently rigorous, rather than a position seriously advocated by anyone. At the 
same time, discussions in African Philosophy of concepts such as communitarianism 
and ubuntu advocate a strongly Anti-Supererogationist perspective. Here recent 
history provides a poignant example of such Anti-Supererogation - as Richard Bell 
notes, 
There should be little doubt that part of the success of South Africa is 
the consistency with which the opposition leaders - Mandela, Tutu, 
Mbeki, Kader Asmal, Joe Slovo [ ... J and others - believed that 
morality required supererogatory acts. A peaceful transition to majority 
democracy required a way of acting that implied self-sacrifice and 
regard for the well-being of others. 12 
What is particularly pertinent about the South African case is that it is not simply 
that of a set of politically-dedicated fanatics chose to accept some heroic sacrifice; 
rather, the self-sacrifice Bell refers to was the forgiveness shown by the oppressed to 
the oppressors. The leaders' belief, that is, was not that their own sacrifice was 
necessary, but that that the oppressed in general would acknowledge the moral 
pressure to forgive past injustices. That this in fact occurred, that the value of 
forgiveness trumped the ostensible right to remain embittered, should be in the back 
of our minds when Supererogationists claim that forgiveness is a paradigm example 
of the purely optional action whose omission is never wrong. 
Initial reasons to doubt Superero~ationism 
Thus far I have emphasised the strangeness of Supererogationist assumptions, and 
I have done so with good reason. Supererogationists constantly punt their view as the 
only way to avoid absurdity in the Paradox of Supererogation, as a perfectly natural, 
rational assumption. Before addressing their arguments, I want to highlight that 
121n his Understandjn~ African Philosophy' A Cross-Cultural approach to Classical and Contemporar:y 
1.1.1=, Routledge, 2002, p88. 
assuming certain acts to be categorically exempt from being required is more 
problematic than they seem to credit. 
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Within the context of any institutional role, it is possible to distinguish acts we are 
obliged to perform from those beyond the scope of obligation: while I am obliged, for 
example, to work a certain number of hours at my job, I am not obliged to bake 
snacks for my co-workers, or to be attentive to their personal difficulties. Where acts 
are both good and beyond the scope of this obligation, they are clearly recognisable as 
"above and beyond" duty. But it is less clear that the same distinction exists in ethics, 
when the context is not our institutionally-defined obligations, but our responsibilities 
as moral agents. That is, while I can easily claim that it is not a requirement of my job 
that I show concern for my co-worker, it seems that I would feel less certain claiming 
that I have no compelling reason to show concern qua human being. It seems to me 
that much of the ostensible strength of Supererogationism derives from the 
assumption that such institutional duties scale up and capture all of ethics, but it is 
nothing like obvious that this is the case. And this is not the only reason to doubt the 
category .... 
The Qri~ins and History of Supererogation - A Critique from Political Economy 
Both the term "supererogation" and much of the theory surrounding it originate in 
a Christian theological debate, and it is valuable to examine this context before 
continuing. Heyd notes that 
Although supererogation is not discussed as such in the New 
Testament, the term supererogation dates back to the Latin version of 
the Bible ... in the parable of the Good Samaritan. After paying ... for 
the care and expenses of the robbed and wounded man, the Samaritan 
adds: 'and whatsoever thou shalt spend over and above (quodcumque 
supererogaveris), I at my return, will repay thee (Luke x, 35)." 
Here, while "saving the victim 's life, taking care of him, etc. was his duty, his 
promise to pay for further expenses was clearly beyond his duty."" Given that this 
parable does not draw a particularly stark distinction, it is not the primary justification 
for religious Supererogation. This is derived from various Biblical references to a 
two-tier set of requirements, typified by the story of the rich man, in which 
13 Superero!:atjoo pp 16-17. 
14Supererogatjoo p17. My italics. 
Jesus is asked 'what good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?" 
to which he replies' if thou wilt enter into life, keep the 
commandments' , but adds: 'if thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou 
hast and give it to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven. 
And come follow me. (Matthew xix, 16-24). " 
From a number of such references including the recommendations of chastity and 
poverty, though drawing primarily on the Old Testament, IO early Christian thinkers 
developed a more systematic two-tier model. These Church fathers distinguished 
between Precepts (strictly obligatory norms) and the (merely recommended) 
Counsels." The former were aimed at those who wanted to do enough to get into 
Heaven, and explained the absolute minimum requirements necessary. The Counsels 
were sets of advice, suggestive rather than imperative, aimed at those who wanted to 
be morally perfect, either to please God, or to ensure entry into Heaven. Heyd notes 
that "originally, the list of counsels (or Evangelical Counsels) included just three 
recommendations: perpetual poverty, perfect chastity, and perfect obedience," and 
concedes the political economy of the concept, in that its promulgation "was 
stimulated by the need to provide a theoretical justification of the monastic ideals." I' 
Systematising the two-tier model even further, the emergent proto-capitalism of 
the Catholic Church then sanctified the model of the "Spiritual Treasury"I ', in which 
"the superabundant merit of Jesus and the Saints, whose good works excelled what 
was necessary for their own salvation"20 was banked on behalf of the Church. This 
credit could then be withdrawn as needed, underwriting the system of "Indulgences," 
whereby Supererogatory merit was converted into actual capital by Pardoners, or all 
Crusaders were granted entry into Heaven. 
7 
The blatantly "commercialised"21 nature of this analysis is particularly alarming in 
that it is not an analogy, but a factual description of the system. Such a model 
assumed that the "merit" attached to a good act (which would necessarily appear to be 
meaningful only with reference to that act) was a bankable, exchangeable good by 
virtue of its being hypothetically quantifiable (by God). One would assume that this 
I~ Supererogation p 17. 
16 See Supererogation pp17-18. 
17 Sypererogatjon piS. See also pp20-21 on Aquinas' arguments in favour of such a system. 
I II Superero~atiQn , pIS. 
]<) Supererocatjon p19. 
20 Supererogation p19. 
21 Superero~atjon p 19. 
would be sufficient basis for rejecting such a system (sports scores, after all , are 
quantifiable without entailing transferability to another team). Surprisingly, however, 
the concept of merit as a bankable commodity did not provide the force of the 
Protestant response .... 
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When Luther, Calvin and other Protestant thinkers responded to both the 
institutional corruption and theoretical difficulties of contemporary Catholicism, they 
did not dispute the coherence of claiming that the merit entailed by good acts could, in 
principle, be horded or re-allocated. Rather, they claimed that: 
Human 'works' are never sufficient for attaining salvation. Without 
God's grace no amount of human works has any meaning, and it is 
only through God's will that we can do any good acts at all. Man is 
justified by faith alone." 
Here Luther held that "no saint has adequately fulfilled God ' s commandments in 
his life. Consequently the saints have done nothing that is superabundant. Therefore 
they have nothing left to be allocated through the indulgences"" and Calvin stated, 
"All the righteousness of men collected into one heap would be inadequate to 
compensate for a single sin."" This rigid deontology moved from the perspective that 
since one ' s obligation to the Creator of the Universe must be infinite, speaking of a 
surplus is both impious and imposs ible. This point undermined the model developed 
by Tertullian, who argued that "God has ordained a special field of liberty (licentia) in 
order to give us an opportunity to act supererogatorily, and this 'licence' is the only 
way to test whose acts are really meritorious by a ' trial of discipline' ."" The 
Protestant response holds that to assert such a field is to "presuppose options which do 
not exist"" and argues for an infinite obligation to the good, commensurate with the 
infinite gratitude due to God. As such, the Protestants account for the Biblical 
distinction between Counse ls and Precepts by interpreting the former as "a sort of 
subjective duty, a precept/or some people,"" where the counsel to chastity is read as 
"commanding chastity for anyone who is in that special 'state ' that enables him to 
remain chaste."" Moderately ad hoc as this last move may appear, post-Reformation 
22 Supererogation . p27. 
B Supererogation p27. 
24 Supererogation p28. 
2~ SupereroeatjoD piS. 
26 Supereroeatioo p28. 
27 Supererogation, p28. Italics in original. 
28 Supererogation, p29. 
9 
Christianity is now firmly Anti-Supererogationist, premising sa lvation on the grace of 
God (which, Heyd notes," is seen as Supererogatory). 
Heyd finds the parallels between the religious and secular models illuminating, 
noting "in both cases the act in question is only expected of a few people, that is, not 
universally demanded. It is only necessary for the achievement of an ideal which is 
'higher' than the end 'ofthose acts which are obligatory."30 It is clear from this 
description (as well as the forgoing) that the original justification for demarcating two 
categories of good act was that the two were seen as aiming at different goals. That is, 
the impetus for the distinction was teleological, assuming that certain, saintly, 
individuals pursued an entirely different end-goal to others. This is coherent in the 
case of religious supererogation, which cites scriptural references to two distinct 
goals, both sufficient for infinite reward." In the secular case, however, it is not clear 
why such a model should be assumed. 
While it is trivially true that some people want to help others to the greatest 
possible extent, while others want merely to perform their duties, this entails nothing 
about the ethical legitimacy of such wants. In the realm of secular ethics, it seems that 
both the saintly and the dutiful orient toward the same end (telos): they want to be 
morally good. Though they differ as to how they perceive this end to be achieved, 
they are both aiming to reach it. In much the same way, I may disagree with a fellow-
traveller over how to reach our destination, but we cannot be described as having 
different goals (this was not true in the religious case, in which both parties 
acknowledged two possible goals before setting out). If we are motivated to be good 
people (that is, we are not talking about the apathetic or the positively vicious), then it 
seems simply weird to describe us as having two different goals. 
My point here is that the original reason for assuming the very idea of an 
obligatory-supererogatory distinction grew from a set of assumptions absent from 
secular ethics. The concept of supererogation originated as an ad hoc solution to a 
specific theological problem, and despite being abandoned as unworkable in this 
original context, gained sufficient historical momentum for Urmson to assume it was 
a coherent category whose absence demanded to be addressed. 
29 Supereroeatjon,.p29. 
30 Supererogation p31. 
i l Though religious supererogation is not my focus, this distinction does raise an interesting question; 
On a Game Theoretical model, would the Saintly strategy have any advantage over the Merely Dutiful? 
Would it remove itself from the pool over time? 
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This is the political economy contemporary Supererogationists gloss over when 
they cast Supererogation ism as merely a response to the Paradox of Supererogation . 
Seen in this context, assuming that some types of action are always obligatory while 
others are always optional seems less like a perfectly natural assumption anyone 
would come to , and more like the end result of a set of historical contingencies 
specific to the Western canon. Of course, this is not sufficient, by itself to scupper 
Supererogationism, as Supererogationists can still note that, in any particular context, 
some good act may exceed what can be required of us. This fact demands explanation, 
and we need not assume separate teloi to coherently describe such acts as 
supererogatory. That said, it seems to me that an awareness of the concept' s pedigree 
should at least leave us wary of Supererogationism. 
An additional worry arising from identifying other-directed goodness with 
saintliness is precisely that saints are rarely seen as agents just like ourselves whose 
motives are transparent and commonplace. Here it does seem that Supererogationists 
promote what Kwame Gyekye casts as a typically Western understanding of 
extraordinarily other-directed behaviour, as the reserve of the eccentric and saintly. 
Such a worldview, he argues, seems to suppose, " that only a few human beings have 
the capacity to practice such basic virtues as love, charity, benevolence, and 
sensitivity to the needs of others.,,32 Lest we assume Gyekye is overstating the case, 
remember that Heyd ' s position exp licitly defines charity, forgiveness, and mercy as 
"only expected of a few people, that is, not universally."" Though Supererogationists 
point out that supererogatory acts are praiseworthy and valuable, this disassociation of 
good acts from everyday motives seems to shoot their hermeneutic point in the foot 
somewhat. 
How not to Refute Supererogation ism 
Despite the oddness of their contention, Supererogationists are predominant in the 
literature of Ethics - the definitive works in the fie ld are written from a 
Supererogationist perspective, Dictionaries of Philosophy list the term with nary a 
qualification, and the coherence of supererogation is tacitly assumed in most 
discussions. Before attempting to redress this situation in the following chapters, I 
will examine two interesting, yet insufficient Anti-Supererogationist arguments. 
32Tradjtjoo and Modernity , p74. 
33 Supererogatjon p31. 
II 
Singer V Wolf 
Susan Wolf begins her prominent paper Moral Saints, "1 don't know whether there 
are any moral saints. But if there are, 1 am glad that neither 1, nor those about whom 1 
care most are among them."" She goes on to elaborate the ways in which we would 
find the maximally moral life (as understood from a Deontological or Utilitarian 
perspective) unsatisfying as a personal goal. Wolf finds much to be avoided in the 
"saintly" life, from the danger that being "very, very nice" would require that we be 
"dull-witted or humourless or bland,"" to the idea that there is something absurd 
about only being able to enjoy self-indulgent pleasures if they are part of some greater 
good: 
It may be that a good golf game is just what is needed to secure that 
big donation to Oxfam. Perhaps the cultivation of one's exceptional 
artistic talent will turn out to be the way one can make one's greatest 
contribution to society, [but these interests] cannot be encouraged for 
their own sakes as distinct, independent aspects of the realisation of 
human good." 
She concludes that if "we have reason to want people to live lives that are not 
morally perfect, then any plausible theory must make use of some conception of 
supererogation."" This particularly extreme instance of the Western disassociation 
from the motive for other-directed goods is one example of an all-too familiar pattern 
in Supererogationist argumentation - a reductio ad absurdum against the idea of 
other-directed good. Peter Singer takes a particularly strong stance against this move, 
simply accepting the consequences. Here he responds, 
Wolf argues that [in pursuing the greatest good] we would have to do 
without a great deal that makes life interesting: opera, gourmet 
cooking, elegant clothes, and professional sport, for a start. The kind of 
life we come to see as ethically required of us would be a single-
minded pursuit of the overall good, lacking that broad diversity of 
interests and activities that, on a less demanding view, can be part of 
our ideal of a good life for a human being. To this, however, one can 
" In The Journal ofphilosophy. Volume LXXIX, no. 8, August 1982, p 419. 
;> Moral Sainls, p422. 
36 Moral Saints) p425, 
31 Moral Sainls, p438. 
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respond that while the rich and varied life that Wolf upholds as an 
ideal may be the most desirable form of life for a human being in a 
world of plenty, it is wrong to assume that it remains a good life in a 
world in which buying luxuries for oneself means accepting the 
continued avoidable suffering of others. A doctor faced with hundreds 
of injured victims of a train crash can scarcely think it defensible to 
treat fifty of them and then go to the opera, on the grounds that going 
to the opera is part of a well-rounded human life. The life-or-death 
needs of others must take priority. Perhaps we are like the doctor, in 
that we live in a time when we all have an opportunity to help to 
mitigate a disaster." 
This example, it seems to me, captures the absurdity of excusing ourselves from 
the responsibility to help others where we can. Something simply seems wrong ifthe 
doctor sees helping others as optional. And it does no good to say that doctors take on 
a duty to help others that the rest of us are not subject to. Simply replace the doctor 
with an opera-aficionado who must decide between helping the wounded from the 
wreck and arriving in time for the opening of the season. That we see no real 
difference seems to support the contention that ought-ness derives not from duties , but 
from our capacity to realise goods (more on this in later chapters). But Wolfs 
bugbear, the idea that we cannot pursue any activity unless it contributes to the greater 
moral good, seems no less absurd. Stacking absurdities against one another cannot 
settle the debate between Supererogationists and Anti-Supererogationists, as what is 
needed is a more thorough account of why we pursue certain goods and not others. 
And this is where Singer falls down. A Utilitarian, Singer sees ethics as "the general 
project of bringing about maximally desirable outcomes [globally]."'· But Utilitarians 
must explain why we would find this best-state-of-affairs-for-the-world a more 
compelling goal than our own happiness. Bernard Williams' Integrity Objection 
suggests that it is not simply selfishness that may hold us back, but the need to make 
sense of pursuing the good at all. We all pursue personal projects, of direct value to 
ourselves, which Williams refers to variously as "lower-order,"" "first-order," 41 or 
31 Practical Ethics -Second Edition Cambridge University Press, 1993 (Repr.1999), p244. 
39 Bernard Williams, A Critique o/Utilitarianism, in Utjljtarianism' For and Against, J.e.c. Smart and 
Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press, 1973, plIO. 
'" A Critique of Utilitarianism, p II O. 
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"ground projects."" But these projects do not simply stand in opposition to the greater 
good; they constitute it. That is, "unless there were first-order projects, the general 
utilitarian project would have nothing to work on, and would be vacuous ."" Since the 
general project of pursuing the greater good (incorporating the good of others) gains 
its value precisely from including my own good, it cannot therefore function by 
always negating those projects we find essentially valuable. Neither Utilitarianism nor 
any other ethical system can function by treating first-order goods as always 
dispensable, that is, by treating all situations as carrying the same trumping-power as 
Singer' s train-wreck. But our commitment to train-wreck survivors over opera is not 
diminished because it does not apply in every case, and Singer's point is that it is no 
different to a very large number of situations in contemporary life." What is needed is 
some account with enough nuance to distinguish between those situations like the 
train-wreck, in which it would be absurd not to assist, and those like the Oxfam golf 
game, in which it would be absurd to see our own happiness as nothing but a bonus. 
Singer's response does not meet this need, and thus cannot scale up to describe 
situations beyond the train-wreck. 
But Supererogation ism, as punted by Heyd and Wolf, cannot explain why the 
train-wreck carries the force it does. If mercy, volunteering, charity and self-sacrifice 
are categorically the sorts of act that cannot be obligations, then how do we 
understand the powerful wrongness of choosing to go the opera? It seems to me that 
Supererogation ists do no better than Singer' s Anti-Supererogationism in providing a 
distinguishing criterion. I suspect that much of Supererogation ism 's plausibility stems 
from downplaying the sheer strangeness of seeing alleviating suffering as an omission 
that should not incur sanction. A thoroughgoing response to the problem of 
Supererogation, then, must provide some mechanism for explaining our commitment 
to greater goods than Heyd and Wolf endorse, without falling to the absurdities 
Williams and Wolf seek to avoid. 
We should not, however, take Wolfs argument to be stronger than it is. Though 
Moral Saints is one of the best known articles of the 1980' s, and constantly associated 
with supererogation, it is not as compelling as this reputation suggests. Wolfs 
42 Persons, Character, and MoralilY, in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, P 12. 
4) A Critique a/Utilitarianism, plIO. 
44 Singer is addressing responses the global wealth discrepancy, in his chapter on Rich and Poor, 
Practical Ethics -Second Edition, pp218-246. 
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argument is that there is a tension between moral demands and the demands of "the 
point of view of individual perfection," from which "we consider what kind of lives 
are good lives, and what kinds of persons it would be good for ourselves and other to 
be."" Here Dancy, himself a Supererogationist, takes issue with Wolfs account: 
The idea is that a moral theory which recognises its own limitations 
will see that it should allow that the actions which we are morally 
required to do are actions which a perfectly admirable person may 
choose not to do . .. . This is, however, not supererogation as we 
originally intended it to be. It is not that there can be actions which 
have the highest moral value but which we are morally permitted not to 
perform. Wolf is not a strong supererogationist. There is nothing here 
like the struggle between the evaluative and the deontic; there are only 
evaluations from two distinct perspectives. For her, the supererogatory 
action is one we are morally required to perform, but this requirement 
is not visible from the point of view of individual perfection. That 
point of view, notice, does not generate reasons which outweigh the 
moral ones .. .. There is nothing here which is both seen as a 
requirement and as something an admirable person might choose not to 
do .. .. The problem, then, is that for Wolf there is no single point of 
view which both accepts that a perfect person would choose the saintly 
action and allows that an admirable person might hold back. I take this 
to be a crucial weakness in her account. It means that she cannot tell us 
why we don't think of the less than saintly person as to that extent 
morally defective. On her account, such a person is failing by the 
standards of the morally ideal, and within the moral perspective is 
therefore open to criticism . .. But this is not how we think of the 
supererogatory. We take there to be a moral permission to hold back" 
But if"a single point of view" is appealing, then why not follow the Ancient Greek 
line, subsuming the "moral" question of how we ought to be toward others within the 
"perfectionist" question of what sort of lives we ought to lead? That is, why not 
assume a Eudaimonist stance, taking the balanced life Wolf herself uses as a yardstick 
" Moral Saints, p437. 
~ 6 Moral Reasons , pp135-136. Italics in original. 
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to be an ethical aim. Wolf concedes that this alternative "naturally suggests itself," but 
finds it "unlikely to succeed."" Her reasons for excluding eudaimonism, however, are 
not particularly persuasive. She begins by claiming that, 
It is doubtful that any single, or even any reasonably small number of 
substantial personal ideals could capture the full range of possible 
ways of realising human potential or achieving human good which 
deserve encouragement and praise." _ 
But what is at issue here is not whether the list of personal ideals is concise, but 
whether we should take up the stance of orienting toward such ideals. The multiple 
realisability of the virtuous life is not news to Virtue theorists, but neither is it seen as 
a damning flaw. Rather, such flexibility is embraced as a strength, suggesting that 
substantial pictures of the Good Life can be constructed without importing culture-
specific biases. In programming terms, it is seen as a feature, not a bug. 
Here Wolf buttresses her position by arguing that there are "strong reasons not to 
want to incorporate [a character-based view of the person] into the framework of 
morality itself."'9 Her next two arguments aim to provide such reasons. The second is 
that: 
There seems to be a recognition that among the immensely valuable 
traits and activities that a human life might positively embrace are 
some of which we hope that, if a person does embrace them, he does so 
not for moral reasons .'· 
But this is to confuse morality 'S direction offit on a virtue model. Here we do not 
try to justify living a good life according to Wolfs narrow definition of the " the moral 
point of view,"" rather, we define the moral in relation to the Good Life. This seems 
to be Wolfs own yardstick, and one she has no difficulty accepting as a reason to 
embrace certain actions or omissions. As such, Wolf already endorses eudaimonism. 
Wolf s third attack on virtue argues that the pertinent difference between "the 
aspects ofa person' s life which are currently considered appropriate objects of moral 
evaluation"" and a eudaimonist view is that, 
" Moral Sainls, p433 . 
.. Moral Sainls, pp433·434. 
49 Moral Saints, p434. 
" Moral Sainls, p434. 
" Moral Sainls, p436 .. 
" Moral Sainls, p434. 
Moral eva luation now is focused primarily on features ofa person ' s 
life over which that person has control; it is largely restricted to aspects 
of his life which are likely to have considerable effect on other people. 
These restrictions seem as if they should be." 
This rejection of a more virtue-oriented perspective suffers by relying on 
modishness. The growing interest in virtue-descriptions, even among Deontologists 
and Consequentia lists, seems to suggest precisely the opposite: restricting moral 
eva luation to "those aspects of the agent which are likely to have a considerable effect 
on other people" looks less and less like a complete picture, and virtue theories are 
proliferating precisely to shore up this explanatory gap. As to restricting moral focus 
to "features ofa person 's life over which that person has control," Wolf confuses 
these with features over which that person has immediate or easy control. Again, it is 
not news that shaping the character is difficult, but is not impossible, and is not seen 
as a damning refutation of Virtue. 
I take Dancy 's response to Wolf as compelling: Wolf does not provide what 
Supererogationists themselves are looking for. What she does do, however, is point 
toward a promising candidate for a response to Supererogation ism - a eudaimonist 
perspective, which defuses the conflict between "individual perfection" and ethical 
considerations by taking them to be aspects of the same pursuit. Such a perspective 
calls "Moderate Communitarianism."'6 Gyekye engages with Urmson, John Rawls, 
and Heyd. His response to Heyd is directed toward the claim that, 
supererogation is justified by showing that some supererogatory acts 
must exist because society cannot require of the individual every act 
that wou ld promote the general good, and because the individual has 
the right to satisfy his wants and to achieve his ends and ideals 
regardless of their social utility (with some obvious limitations of 
course)." 
Here Gyekye notes with suspicion that, 
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What Heyd is saying is that the existence and exercise of the 
individual's autonomy and rights justify supererogation ism, for they 
set limits to what the individual, concerned with the fulfilment of his 
own needs and welfare, can be expected to do in meeting the needs of 
others . The implication here is thus that the denial of 
supererogationism will lead to the inappropriate extension of the 
individual's moral responsibility and the consequent sacrifice or 
subversion of his autonomy and personal needs." 
Gyekye then responds to the supererogationist claim that "some form of self-
sacrifice cannot be required of any and every moral agent,,,'9 arguing that: 
The question is, which form of self-sacrifice can or should be required 
of the moral agent, and how do we determine that? For some people, 
providing the slightest assistance of any kind to someone in distress 
will be self-sacrifice; others however, will not consider such acts as 
sending huge amounts of money to famine-stricken areas within their 
nation or outside it, or helping to get someone out of real danger, as 
se lf-sacrificial or heroic or saintly. What all this means surely is that 
the field of our moral responsibilities should not be circumscribed. The 
moral life, which essentially involves paying regard to the needs, 
interests, and well-being of others, already implies self-sac rifice and 
loss, that is loss of something - one's time, money, strength and so on. 
56 Tradition and Modernity, p3S. 
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There is, in my view, no need, therefore, to place limits on the form of 
the self-sacrifice and, hence, the extent of our moral responsibilities.'" 
I am inclined to agree with Gyekye's conclusion, that the proper response to the 
problem of supererogation cannot be to circumscribe certain acts as categorically 
included or excluded from the field of moral responsibility. I find much to agree with 
in Gyekye's approach, and in Chapter 2 I follow on from his positive account of our 
relation to the good. However, I do not think hi s response here is quite sufficient to 
meet Heyd, and see three difficulties with his argument. The first is that differences in 
what people consider to be saintly or heroic cannot be a sufficient basis from which to 
challenge Supererogation ism. Heyd, in his discussion of "moral modesty,"" 
establishes that the agent's feeling of obligation or its absence is irrelevant to the 
normative nature of the act. That is, my thinking of some act as necessary has no real 
bearing on whether it is in fact required of me. 
The second difficulty is that Gyekye's argument is too quick, and too scant, to deal 
with Heyd's account, which rests not on the claim Gyekye quotes, but on a number of 
rather more complex arguments. As I have said , Heyd ' s arguments are probably the 
most rigorous defence of Supererogationism, and demand a more complete response 
if they are to be refuted (this is the task I take up in Chapter 2). 
Finally, as with Singer, though an appeal to an Anti-Supererogatory model is 
apparent in Gyekye, it remains too much of a sketch. The proper response to the 
problem of supererogation requires an account of why we pursue certain goods and 
not others, for while Gyekye is right that simply cordoning off whole categories of act 
is insufficient, we must some mechanism for avoiding the absurdities 
Supererogationists fear. 
It seems that the suspicious historica l provenance of the idea of supererogation, 
and its generally awkward fit while addressing the problem it sets out to solve, should 
bolster our initial suspicion of the idea, and move us toward Anti-Supererogationism. 
But our response must be more nuanced than Singer or Gyekye's. It must evade 
objections from Integrity or moral modesty, respond to Supererogationists' positive 
arguments, and provide a detailed picture of why we pursue certain goods and not 
others. 
60 Tradition and Modernity, p73. Italics in original. 
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Conclusion 
In this introductory chapter, I have outlined the problem of supererogation, and 
emphasised the problematic nature of assuming a Supererogationist stance. I have 
noted that such a stance relies overmuch on our everyday notion of institutionally-
defined duties, and that the concept of supererogation is not simply a naturally logical 
assumption, but a defunct and rather counterintuitive ad hoc response to a parochial 
theological problem. To borrow Dancy' s description, "I think it one of the positions 
of which Aristotle would say that nobody would hold it except as the result of a 
theory."" Finally, I have noted, in my discussion of Singer, Wolf, and Gyekye, how 
not to defeat Supererogation ism, and what an Anti-Supererogationist theory must do. 
In the following chapters, I attempt such a rigorous Anti-Supererogationist response. 
62 Moral Reasons, pI3l. I am taking some rhetorical license here - Dancy is talking about Anti-
Supererogationism. I feel that his description better captures his own position though. 
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Chapter 2 
Against Supererogationism 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present what I take to be the four strongest arguments for 
believing in a category of supererogatory acts. Responding to each of these 
arguments, I find them insufficient reason to doubt the plausibility and coherence of 
Anti-Supererogationism. In the process, I sketch a more nuanced account of Good-> 
Ought than Supererogationists seem to recognise, suggesting the plausibility of 
accepting an altruistically freighted morality. Finally, I note that martyrdom may be 
the only example of a supererogatory act, though there is reason to doubt even this 
much. 
The Justifications for Superero!:atjonism 
Support for Supererogationism rests on four arguments. The first, and most 
generally cited, concludes that if Good implies Ought, then the moral agent must be 
absurdly over-obligated. The next three arguments, drawn from Heyd, conclude that 
there is no reason to assert that Good implies Ought, that ethical requirements cannot 
always override personal autonomy, and that compelling all good acts removes the 
scope for freely chosen acts. 
In addition, Heyd offers two positive "axiological" reasons to want to perform 
Supererogatory acts. It seems to me that these axio logical conditions only support a 
Supererogationist position if the first three arguments hold. If, as I will argue, the 
former arguments are inconclusive, then the axiological conditions support Anti-
supererogationism more readily than supererogationism. 
The Reductio; Absurd Over-Obligation 
When Heyd argues that "society cannot require of the individual every act that 
would promote the general good,"" he invokes a reductio in which believing 
Good->Ought entails that we paralyse ourselves trying to do every possible good. 
The suggestion here is that an agent trying to be responsive to every good act would 
be in a situation like that of Winnie the Pooh trying to decide which friend to visit; 
He thought he would go and see Eeyore, because he hadn't seen him 
since yesterday. And as he walked through the heather, singing to 
- - - ---
63 SupererQ~atiQn, p 166. 
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himself, he suddenly realised he hadn't seen Owl since the day before 
yesterday .... Well, he went on singing, until he came to the part of the 
stream where the stepping-stones were, and when he was in the middle 
of the third stone he began to wonder how Kanga and Roo and Tigger 
were getting on, because they all lived together in a different part of 
the Forest. And he thought, "I haven't seen Roo for a long time, and if 
I don' t see him today, it will be a still longer time." So he sat down on 
the stone in the middle of the stream, and sang another verse of his 
song, while he wondered what to do" 
The worry here is not simply that we will join Pooh in his absurd existential 
paralysis on the stone, but that any action we do take will be arbitrary, since any 
action will ignore more potential goods than it realises. As Jonathan Dancy puts it, "if 
we deny [that an action can have value while lacking compulsive force] , our only 
account of supererogation seems to be one under which less than perfect actions are 
wrong but not reprehensible."" Not only is this sort of global penitence unfashionable 
in secular ethics, but it seems that a model of the Good that effectively rules out the 
possibility of doing good cannot be right. 
This is the default argument against Good->Ought, and Supererogationist 
positions are rarely more sophisticated than some variation of it. Though Heyd 
doesn't rely on this argument alone, it is apparent that he assumes, as do most 
Supererogationists, that anti-supererogationism requires far too much of the moral 
agent. 
Against Good->Ought 
Next, Heyd argues that the Good-Ought tie-up is premised on a mistake. He holds 
that assuming that any given "Good" necessarily entails an "Ought" for any agent 
"seems to take advantage of the wide range of incompatible uses of 'ought'." 66 
Heyd sketches a rough taxonomy of the incompatible uses of 'ought' as follows; 
In its commendatory use it may very well be logically tied in with 
'good'; it may also be so - according to some theories - if it is 
understood as constituting a reason for action (as it is indeed rational 
to do the good, to promote whatever is valuable). 'Ought' is also 
... A.A. Milne, The House at Pooh Cower, Methuen Children's Books, 1928 (Repr 1972), pp53-54. 
" In his Moral Reasons, 1993, Blackwell, p 13l.My italics. 
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entailed by 'good' ifit is interpreted impersonally as ' ought to be' (i.e. 
if X is a good state of affairs, let X exist). But all these uses fail to 
support the mora l position of the critics of unqualified 
supererogationism, because what is relevant to their critique is whether 
'good' entails ' ought' in the prescriptive, personal sense. 67 
This amounts to the premise that not all uses of "good" entail "ought." Heyd then 
argues for a "gap between judgements of what is good to do and what one ought to 
do" in that" 'good may be used impersonally, while 'ought' involves human 
agency."" Arguing that this reflects "a general difference between value concepts and 
deontic concepts," 69 he supports this substantive premise as follows; 
'Good' characterises states of affairs, motives, personality traits, as 
well as actions, independently of the existence of agents who can bring 
them about or hope to. 'Ought' , however, at least in its prescriptive 
sense, applies only in si tuations in which there is an agent of whom a 
celtain action is required. Even the apparently impersonal phrase 'X 
ought to be done ' has prescriptive force only if it applies conjunctively 
(or disjunctively) to members of a certain group. 70 
Having discredited the merely valuable as a source of prescriptive force, Heyd 
must naturally furnish some alternative. Here he holds that: 
Moral reasons for action prescribing what one ought to do arise then, 
not from the desirability of states of affairs, but from a certain 
relationship between the agent and the beneficiary of the action. In this 
I fo llow Prichard' s argument, ' that in order to think of some change as 
one which we ought to cause, we must think of the change as in some 
special way related to ourselves ... .' This spec ial relationship may 
originate from family relations, jobs, previous undertakings, 
opportunities to help someone in need, justice etc. 71 
Given that this relationship is not necessarily entailed by 'good states' simpliciter, 
Heyd finds that " it cannot be the case . .. that any valuable state of affa irs in itself 
67 Supererogation p 171. Italics in original. 
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constitutes a reason for action (in the sense of 'ought') for an ind ividual person."" 
Note that this move does not collapse into an argument against duties, presumably 
because duties describe those situations in which there is always a special relationship 
between an act and ourselves. Heyd does, however, find this argument sufficient to 
conclude, in a Prichard ian mode, that "Good->Ought" is founded on an error. 
The Autonomv of the Individual 
Heyd finds that considerations of personal autonomy "loosen" 73 the Good-Ought 
tie-up further, invoking Bernard Williams' critique of Utilitarianism, that the pursuit 
of the greater good is only coherent if lower-order projects exist, "For if everyone 
worked for the promotion of the general good, whose good would be promoted? .. . it 
is the first-order life plans and projects that should be taken as a starting point, and ... 
morality ... 'works on' these plans."" 
On this model; 
Although within a moral system of duty or justice every individual 
counts the same, impartiality cannot be expected of a person when he 
compares the weight of his own desires with that of others. For the 
integrity of the individual consists exactly in the special weight he 
gives to his own ends ... [thUS] considerations of justice make it 
unacceptable to require any individual to work ceaseless ly for the 
welfare of others (or to the point at which the marginal utility of his 
effort becomes zero). " 
This point, that any moral claim must start from our agency and thus cannot 
undermine it, is the crux of Heyd 's argument, as it justifies paring the demands of 
ethical responsibil ity down to a "minimalist" model. 
Since "such a minimalist concept of duty cannot [however] exhaust the realm 
of moral value," Heyd finds "room for acts beyond duty that are nevertheless 
morally good."'· To prove that such acts are not merely beyond duty, but also 
morally good, Heyd fields arguments for his positive, axiological case. 
n Supereroeatjoo, p 172. 
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The Value of Freedom 
Heyd argues that "supererogation is necessary as providing an opportunity to 
exercise certain virtues," 77 by which he means that virtuosity found in reaching 
the good without coercion. The claim here is that there is a positive moral value in 
doing a good thing willingly, and that this value is not accorded any space for 
expression on an anti-supererogationist model. Heyd cites 1.M. Ratcliffe on Good 
Samaritan Laws, arguing that these are analogous to anti-supererogation ism: 
Good Samaritan Laws make certain morally wrong actions punishable 
by law (e .g. the refusal to lend help to people in peril) . Those who wish 
to restrict such laws believe that not all moral duties should be legally 
binding. Similarly, supererogationists believe that not all morally 
valuab le acts should be considered as (morally) obligatory. Both 
parties hold that compulsion (legal and moral respectively) is in itself 
bad, and cannot be justified simply by proving the desirability of the 
enforced action . Those who oppose the attempt to legislate on moral 
affairs argue that it is not only self-defeating (in the sense that coercing 
people to comply with the moral duty of gratitude, honesty, or respect 
changes the very nature of the act), but that it also amounts to an 
illegitimate violation of individual freedom. 78 
Axiology I : Social Cohesion 
Heyd is at pains to point out that Supererogationists recognise the value of 
other-directed, non-dutiful acts, since such action; 
may contribute to the strengthening of social bonds and augment the 
feelings of a close-knit community. For by doing more than is 
required , a member of a group shows that he has an interest in his 
fellow members which is deeper than his contractual commitments, or 
than the personal benefi t he can draw from the group. Consequently, 
the relations between the members of the group become more friendly, 
personal, and based on good will. Benevolence and gratitude enhance 
71 Supererogation, p1 75. 
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mutual trust and confidence .. .. Supererogatory morality adds love of 
one's fellow-beings to the duty of respect for persons. 79 
Heyd holds that such a concess ion, even to the extent that "some measure of 
supererogatory behaviour is necessary for the existence of society" 80 is fully 
compatible with unqualified supererogation ism . This is so because: 
Although, except for obligatory standards (which must apply 
universally), not every (or any particular) member of the group ought 
to do more than is strictly required, the survival of the group requires 
that some people surpass the minimal standards. 81 
In addition, "even if a society (or an institution) could survive if its members 
no more than adhered to the requirements and rules of behaviour, it would be 
morally deficient." 82 Here he cites Richard Titmuss on voluntary blood-donation, 
arguing that "social institutions must provide the opportunity to practice altruism," 
as it seems "highly probable that a decline in the spirit of altruism (or 
volunteering) will be accompanied by deep changes in other spheres of human 
relationship." 83 
Supererogation, then, is punted as the rational resolution to the conflict 
between society ' s need for other-directed, extra-dutiful, behaviour, and the 
negative implications of making all good acts obligatory. Supererogationism 
therefore seems justified as long as we continue to take both of these pressures 
seriously. 
Axiology 2: Supererogation and Ideals 
Heyd's final argument, from "Ideals"" is closely tied to the generally good 
value to society of supererogatory acts: because these are exemplary, they 're 
useful hermeneutically. That is, because it is good to perform supererogatory 
acts, it is good to praise them, and value them highly as examples, to instil 
precisely that cascade of fellow-feeling Heyd notes in his argument from 
social benefits. This provides an additional value, an instrumental social value, 
79 Supererogation, p 178. 
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motivating us to praise such acts, even if we are constrained not to denounce 
their omission. 
Anti-Supererogationist Responses 
The foregoing arguments represent the justification for invoking 
Supererogationism. While most Supererogationists are satisfied to use some 
permutation of the initial reductio, Heyd has formulated the latter arguments to 
remove any reason to doubt that Supererogatory goods are both a coherent and a 
necessary category. Having given these arguments a fair showing, noting their 
prima facie persuasiveness, I now return to each in sequence, providing an Anti-
Supererogationist response to each and, in the process, sketching the outline of a 
comprehensive Anti-Supererogationist ethic. 
Against the Reductio 
I will begin with a response to the reductio against anti-supererogation ism. As 
noted above, this holds that believing that Good->Ought entails that we paralyse 
ourselves trying to do every possible good. Given the self-evident undesirability 
of such a model, we may ask whether it need be asserted by Anti-
Supererogationists. The answer, it seems to me, is that it need not. Even if we 
assume that Good->Ought, there appear be three constraints on this implication. 
The first of these is the old chestnut that ought->can - that is, since ought implies 
can, any situation in which a good is something which r cannot achieve, is one in 
which no obligation exists. Thus, while I am capable of recogni sing that unilateral 
nuclear disarmament is a good state of affairs, it is both unlikely and improper that 
I be judged harshly for failing to bring this state about. 
Pace Heyd, if it were within my power to bring such a state about (were I, for 
example, a strange visitor from another world, imbued with special powers by 
Earth's yellow sun) an anti-supererogationist model would argue that I have an 
obligation" to do so (and it seems se lf-evident that we would think less of a 
superhero who failed to perform extraordinarily good acts). 
8S As I noted in Chapter I. the word "obligation" connotes a contractual, legalistic context in which I 
am obligated to perform an action or fulfil a role by virtue of some implicit or explicit agreement. This 
is at odds with the picture of axiological motivation I am driving towards in Chapter Three, and as such 
I try to use the term as little as poss ible. This isn't always possible however, given its prevalence and 
utility. As such, "obligation" should be understood as a synonym for "ought" where it appears. 
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If the ought-can implication doesn' t appear to lighten our loads much (or 
Superman's at all), we may examine the second constraint: the pursuit of the 
greatest good. That is, we are not obliged to perform a good act if performing it 
excludes a better one. This seems uncontroversial to me, and entails two sorts of 
nuance overlooked by Heyd ' s sketch of Anti-Supererogationism: teleology and 
fine-grained description. Here we must ensure that our descriptions of an act are 
correct: my refusing to give blood out of selfishness is not the same act as refusing 
to give blood because I am training for a marathon to raise funds for charity. (I 
will return to teleology in more detail later.) 
Of course, such a model still seems to demand of me that I must either be 
unable to do anything for others, or be too busy doing something else for others. If 
I am simply pursuing my own interests, I am still indictable. But here we come to 
the third constraint: that the greatest good need not be interpreted as divorced 
from our own interests. The supererogationist reductio assumes that anti-
supererogationists deny the value of personal goods (Wolf is particularly guilty of 
this in Moral Saints) . This move is mysterious, and I see no reason why it is 
intrinsic to Anti-Supererogationism - my own good must always be factored. 
Excluding my interest might have made sense if we persisted in thinking that 
Good->Ought committed us to pursuing all goods, in which case our own good 
would always be less important than the Global Good. But the constraints I have 
noted so far drastically pare-down those goods that impinge immediately on us: 
The set "goods it is within my power to realise" is a far smaller set than "all 
possible goods." The set of goods I can achieve without negating greater goods is 
smaller still. Even smaller is the set "actions I can be reasonably sure will result in 
realisable goods without negating greater realisable goods," particularly in the 
context of the long-term teleology that is the human situation. So the idea that my 
good doesn't stand a chance when pitted against other goods is nowhere near as 
secure as it seems. The competition, in any particular instance, is not as tough as 
supererogationists seem to imagine. 
In addition, my ongoing good differs from other goods in that, at the level of 
my general well-being at least, it constitutes my ongoing capacity to do any good 
at all. 86 As such, even a Saint has a pragmatic reason to be somewhat se lf-
86 Incidentally, when Pooh does eventually leave the stone it is, like most of his alrnost-sphexish 
tropisms, to find food. 
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interested. My point here is not to argue that our raison d'etre is or ought to be 
maintaining ourselves merely in order to continue to serve the greater good. I 
agree with Wolf that such a "Saintly" life is a perversion of the Good Life (though 
I strongly disagree that Anti-Supererogationism entails such that we ought to live 
such a limited existence). Rather, my point is that enough of our own goods are 
over-subscribed - by our se lf-interest and the project of pursuing the good 
generally - that our good need not be overwhelmed entirely, even before we see it 
as intrinsically worthy. 
Since my own good (which is, after all, most immediately accessible to me) is 
to some extent required to achieve any good, and is a valid pursuit in itself that 
need not be trumped by other goods, my own good must always be factored. 
It seems to me that such a model, starting from the assumption that Good does 
indeed imply Ought, seems to provide sufficient space within which to live a life 
that is not significantly diminished. There are many things I recognise as goods, 
but I am not under an obligation to pursue them, because the particulars of my 
situation make them impossible for me to bring about, or impossible without 
negating other goods I am pursuing. These constraints alone provide a powerful 
vocabu lary with which to describe ethical obligation and its exemptions (the 
nuance of which is entirely ignored by Supererogationists). In addition, the good 
that I protect by eschewing actions that may negate it, can be my own good, for 
there are no grounds for excluding it categorically. This seems very different from 
the absurd over-extension suggested by supererogationists. In fact, it seems very 
much like our conventional understanding of obligation. 
Despite functioning through exemptions to Good->Ought, I don't regard this 
model as Qualified Supererogationism. This is because, unlike other qualified 
models, it doesn't cordon off whole categories of act - exemptions vary from one 
situation to the next - and it is possible, on this account, that I may be obliged to 
sacrifice my life for some good. Thus, while this model may allow exemption 
from the obligation to respond to all needs around me, it does not exempt me from 
any number of specific obligations entailed by goods within my reach. And, pace 
Rawls, it does not class my self-interested projects as categorically exempt. It 
seems, therefore, that this model is legitimately called Anti-Supererogatory, 
though anti-supererogationism clearly has recourse to more absurdity-avoiding 
resources than Supererogationists credit the position with . 
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Good- >Qught 
The supererogationist may wonder why I assert Good->Qught as a default 
position, given Heyd's argument that general goods need not entail specific 
oughts. The answer is partly apparent in the forgoing discussion of the constraints 
on Anti-Supererogationism: since Qught->Can limits the scope of my obligation 
to those goods within my effective reach, the only good states that can entail 
oughts for me are those which have some "special relationship" relative to me and 
my projects. 
It is important to note that this move conforms to Heyd 's own argumentS 7 His 
initial premise mapped a possible way that Good->Qught could go wrong, in 
assuming that personally prescriptive oughts were entailed by impersonal, general 
descriptions of The Good. His substantive premise then asserted that this was the 
case, that it was "a general difference between value concepts and deontic 
concepts" 88 that the former can be applied in a broader set of circumstances than 
the latter. But while it is true that "Good" can be used in a general sense, it can 
also have a personal context. Given that Qught->Can constrains Good->Qught to 
precisely these cases, we thus avoid the error Heyd points out, and do not seem to 
me to be ad hoc in doing so. 
Here a critic may claim that I am playing on the ambiguity of the "special 
relationship." We may note that Heyd himself seems to shift the use of this term 
somewhat. Where Prichard describes a relation to an act "in order to think of 
some change as one which we ought to cause, we must think of the change as in 
some special way related to ourselves," " Heyd talks about "a certain relationship 
between the agent and the beneficiary of the action." " 
It seems to me that Prichard ' s use is the more pertinent and there is nothing 
devious about claiming that good states specific to the agent's scope of action 
seem to meet the requirement of being related in some special way to the agent. 
Here I am in agreement with Dancy, who finds that: 
the special relation need not be anything very extraordinary. It could 
simply be that of opportunity. If it were, we wou ld have the plausible 
17 Supererogation. pp 17 1-172. 
IS Supererogation , p 171. 
89 Moral Obligatjon, p 153. Supererogation, p 172. 
~o Supererogatjon, p172. My italics . 
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result that if a change would have high value, anyone with the 
opportunity should bring it about. But if this is the sort of picture we 
end up with, we have not established anything like the radical 
independence of the deontic from the evaluative that Urmson thought 
he was moving towards .... On this restricted picture we have not 
moved very far from Urmson's position, but already we find ourselves 
denying the possibility of supererogation . ... Though the evaluative 
properties are distinct from the deontic ones, there is still a general 
structural relation between them. The deontic ones result from the 
combination of value and special relation' l 
It seems then, that my Anti-Supererogationist model asserts Good->Ought 
while standing up to both Heyd 's attempted logical refutation, and the reductio of 
ethical paralysis. Having thus defeated the two strongest arguments against Good 
->Ought, I move on to other objections. 
The "I" in Autonomy of the Individual 
Most ofHeyd's argument from the autonomy of the individual constituted an 
assault on the reductio that I have just circumvented. However, implicit in 
defending the autonomy of the individual , as I noted, is the idea that any moral 
claim must start from our agency and thus cannot undermine it. Here we find the 
suggestion that the "special relationship" we have toward a good state cannot be 
such that it requires substantial risk to our lives or lifestyles, as these constitute 
the very things grabbed by normative force . Between Prichard and Williams, 
Heyd has significant support for the claim that the normative force of any moral 
claim must derive from our agency. 
I have no interest in disagreeing with this point. Where I do disagree, however, 
is with the assumption that this excludes the possibility of an obligation to risk 
ourselves. This disagreement arises from the teleology entailed by my second 
constraint. While it is true that "I" must be involved in a relevant relationship to 
any ethical situation to feel its pull , the "I" involved here is not "me" in the 
immediate sense, but the richer construct of my telos. While thi s statement is 
blatantly Aristotelian, I find nothing in it that is incommensurable with other 
models. If we are going to situate the agent as the locus of ethical force, then it 
91 Moral Reasons, p130. 
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seems proper to distinguish between my immediate sense of myself and the more 
enduring teleological "I." To say that we feel a normative pressure to favour our 
teleological selves over our immediate selves seems both true and corroborated by 
experience. As such, teleology explains how there is no necessary contradiction in 
feeling an obligation (necessarily realised through our agency) to act against our 
own (immediate) best interests (when this is best for our long term interests). 
Though I will not argue the point extensively here, it seems to me that the 
indefinite extension of our teloi into a context that must be treated as shared by 
virtue of its uncertainty constitutes our moral investment in the greater good. That 
is to say, where our projects and interests extend beyond our immediate context 
(into the future, or on a large scale), they diffuse and become caught up with those 
of others. As such, the general good is not an abstract concept, distinct from our 
attainable goods, but a coherent (and complex) state, with an uncertain, but real 
relationship to any and every agent. 
Invoking teleology, then, provides a framework against which we may override 
our immediate good in favour of our teleological good, which may easi ly coincide 
with the general good. So much, then for the sacrosanct autonomy of the 
individual. 
Against Compulsion: The Lesbian Rule 
Thus far I have argued for a robust Anti-Supererogationism that does not fall to 
Heyd's negative arguments. What remains is his positive argument that an ethical 
model which provides no scope for freely chosen goods (what Tertullian called 
"/icentia "), denies whole classes of virtuous action. Surely here we must concede 
some form of supererogation? I do not think that the Anti-Supererogationist need 
concede any such thing. It is trivially true that freely chosen good actions are 
superior, by that token, to compelled good actions, but it is not apparent to me that 
Anti-Supererogationism eliminates the possibility of freely choosing a good act. I 
don ' t mean that we have the potential for effectively meaningless 
oversubscription: " I freely choose the only option that doesn ' t involve sanction." 
Rather, I'm suggesting a somewhat more nuanced understanding of the praise or 
sanction appropriate to such situations. It is apparent that Heyd ' s perceived 
antagonist when arguing for a field of supererogatory virtue is the legislator of 
Good Samaritan laws, who would articulate all goods as rules or duties. But this is 
not the only way to frame our moral responsibilities. Given the significantly 
particularist nature of responsibilities toward others (depending on one ' s 
idiosyncratic position relative to others), it is apparent that many or most 
situations in which we are able to bring about a good will not have an explicitly 
articulated rule attached to them." As such, it seems that any Anti-
Supererogationism must take the concept of the Lesbian Rule seriously. Here 
Aristotle says: 
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About some things it is impossible to legislate, so that a special decree 
is required. For when the object is indeterminate, so also is the rule, 
like the leaden rule of Lesbian architecture. Just as this rule adapts to 
fit the shape of the stone and does not remain rigid, so the special 
decree adapts to fit the circumstances·' 
That is, the imposs ibility of forming general rules does not remove the ought, 
which arises from the need to bring about positive values. What is thus required 
of an individual agent is the capacity to recognise properly the precise nature of 
our obligation and to act on it. In such situations it is quite possible to do less than 
is required of us without receiving sanction. So it does not follow that making 
good acts obligatory excludes the field in which our autonomous virtue is 
exercised. While there is an obligation to perform certain acts, the difficulty in 
identifying and executing them properly is a significant source of merit. 
Converse ly, general social sanction may well be impossible (as the facts of the 
matter are not apparent at the time) . However, since we are invoking a 
teleo logical model here, en situ or legal judgements do not exhaust the resources 
of sanction - confessing to a friend that one was aware of being best suited, but 
refused to act - can and ought to garner condemnation. The same is true of a 
hi storical judgement: we would hate to be remembered, or even generally thought 
of while alive, as unlikely to do what is right. 
This is, of course, the basis of a virtue ethic and may thus be disputed by dyed-
in-the-wool deontologists (and broadly deontic models such as rights-based and 
contract-based approaches). Again, I doubt that Anti-Supererogationists need 
92 Although strongly associated with Dancy's work (which is certainly its most thoroughgoing 
articulation), "particularistic strands can be found in various contemporary developments; it is common 
to hear that moral fules, or moral theory if we take the business of theory to be the provision afmles, 
cannot cope with the rich multiplicity of lived situations," (Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons, x). 
"Njcomachean Ethics Book V: I 0:1137 b20-31. Translation by Roger Crisp, (Cambridge Texts in the 
History o[ Philosophy), Cambridge, 2000, pIOO. 
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concede this point, since asserting the efficacy and applicability of Deontology 
doesn' t require that we exclude any role for ax iology [direct response to value]. 
That is, we can be deontologists instrumentally, without claiming that deontology 
exhausts the realm of moral obligation. 
Gyekye presents such a model quite effectively in Tradition and Modernity." 
His model accommodates both rights and "free-floating positive moral 
imperatives" " generated by the particulars of our situations relative to the needs 
of others. Gyekye does this by starting from an axiological position, in which 
axiology provides the normative pressure toward good states (whether generally 
or specifically applicable), while rights-based deontology is instrumentally useful 
in promoting these goods, where they can be formulated generally. 
Gyekye's inclusive attitude toward deontology here is interesting, since 
Particularist accounts driven by axiological response are generally distinguished 
by their dismissal of generali st rule-invoking models. This is apparent from 
statements like "there are no defensible moral principles ... moral thought does 
not consist in the appl ication of moral principles to cases, and [the] morally 
perfect person should not be conceived as a person of principle,"" or " in all ... 
cases ... the rule or algorithm represents a falling off from full practical 
rationality, not its flouri shing or completion."·' Though it starts fro m the same 
assumption (that Oughts are generated by realisable Goods), Gyekye's account 
finds space for generally articulable duties where these are generated by rights. 
His argument strikes me as both interesting and correct, and J wi ll outline it 
briefly to establish the grounds for some commingling of deontology and 
axiology. 
Noting that ethical models that foreground the greater or communal good (he 
is discussing African and Western Communitarianism, and African Socialism) 
tend to give short-shrift to individual rights, Gyekye argues that "denial of rights 
or reduction of rights to a secondary status does not adequately reflect the claims 
of individuality mandated in the notion of the moral worth of the individual."·' 
'H Tradi tion and Modernity, pp35-76. 
9~ Tradition and Modernity, p69. 
96Dancy, in his entry on Moral Particularism for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Ph jlosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/ 
91 Martha Nussbaum, Loye's Knowledge: Essays 00 PhilQsophy and Literature, Oxford University 
Press, 1990, p73. 
98 Tradition and Modernity , p62. 
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The practical implementation of any axiological ethical system, concerned with 
values such as dignity99, must therefore involve rights. And rights-discourse, 
generalist as it is, generates a corresponding body of duty-discourse, through 
"negative moral imperatives,"'·· that is "one ' s right not to be harmed imposes a 
responsibility on others not to harm one."'·' This is the "correlativity thesis," '·' 
that duties are reducible to the responsibilities generated by rights. In accepting 
that rights are necessary to ethical praxis, Gyekye concedes that the set of duties 
entailed by them will also be necessary or useful. We should not, however, "make 
a fetish of rights,"'·J slipping into the assumption that negatively-generated moral 
imperatives exhaust the category of moral responsibilities, the majority of which 
are still "free-floating positive moral imperatives" '.4 generated by responses to 
value. Gyekye's Anti-Supererogationism therefore appears capable of supporting 
a robust ethical system whose normative force derives from axiology, but which 
incorporates some of the general rules of deontology. 
This does not seem like a forced marriage to me, rather, it seems like a more 
complete description than mere deontology can furnish , since it seems simply 
weird to hold that deontological reasons have normative force independent of the 
values they aim at. But if we concede this and Aristotle's point - that we 
encounter ethi cal challenges whose proper response cannot be cashed-out in a 
general rule - then the absence of a relevant rule isn't identical to the absence of a 
conclusive reason to pursue value . Situations, therefore, may dictate that we cut 
out the deontological middleman and respond to the values of a situation directly. 
Minimal Supererogationism 
The argument for Supererogation ism, as I have shown, rests primarily on the 
idea that an Anti-Supererogationist model, assuming that Good->Ought, leads to 
one or another kind of absurd claim on the moral agent. I have responded to each 
!i9 The irreducible value of dignity is one of three arguments Gyekye deploys in Tradition and 
Modernity, pp62-64, though all three can be glossed as arguing for necessary minimal conditions fo r an 
individual to achieve eudaimonia in a community. 
lOll Tradition and Modernity, p68. 
101 Traditjon and Modernity , pp68-69. 
102 Gyekye attributes this thesis to Joseph Raz in Tradition and Modernity p69, though Raz directly 
opposes the reduction of duties to rights as proposed by Dworkin and Mackie in his own The Morality 
of Freedom, Clarendon Press, 1986, p193. 
tOJ In his earlier version of the same argument, Person and Community in African Thought, in Th.e... 
African Philosophy Reader P.H Coetzee and A.P.l. Roux (eds), Routledge 1998, p330. 
104 Tradition and Modernity, p69. 
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of these arguments and demonstrated that Anti-Supererogationism - realised with 
more nuance than the straw-men Supererogationists set up - need not fall to any 
of them. As such, there does not appear to be any reason to assume the existence 
of a counter-intuitive category of supererogatory goods shared by all instances of 
charity, generosity, mercy, martyrdom, heroism and kindness. 
There does, however, still appear to be room for at least a limited form of 
Supererogationism. Martyrdom, it seems, will always violate our integrity. While 
we may well have reason to perform many actions for the sake our teleological 
investment in a context larger than the immediate, acts of martyrdom, by 
definition, nullify our capacity to participate in a greater context. Such acts, 
therefore, will always be subject to the integrity exemption. Despite being the 
only supererogatory act, martyrdom seems, prima facie, to be genuinely 
supererogatory in the sense asserted by Supererogationists - an act that brings 
about an actual, realisable good is certainly praiseworthy - yet, by virtue of the 
integrity exemption, can never be seen as a requirement. While the individual 
may have reason to pursue the good brought about by an act of martyrdom, that 
good, since it negates the possibility of any other good, cannot be a greater good 
for the agent than continuing to live. Despite this, martyrs may bring about an 
otherwise unrealisable good for others and thus be unqualifiedly deserving of our 
praise. 
This is a form of Qualified-Supererogationism (operating through exemptions 
to the default assumption that Good->Ought) amounting to the claim that there is 
one supererogatory act, and that the category of Supererogation, such as it is, is 
identical to the category "acts of martyrdom." I will call this claim Minimal-
Supererogation ism. I think this is the position Dancy arrives at, arguing that: 
The main argument that we need [supererogation] consists in appeal to 
examples like that of the recruit who throws himself on the grenade. 
We do want to say that though the action is supremely good, he had no 
duty to do it and would not have been wrong to have held back, even 
though all would have died." 'os 
lOS Moral Reasons, p130. 
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This is not just Dancy's "main argument," ultimately, it seems to be his major 
concern,106 since he is comfortable conceding, where Unqualified 
Supererogationists like Rawls and Heyd are not, that this: 
does not show that any amount of agent-relative disvalue, no matter 
how small, is sufficient to overthrow large amounts of neutral value ... 
. Sometimes then, the situation will be one which calls for the 
sacrifice.107 
Rejecting the generalist idea that acts are categorically (that is, generally) 
supererogatory, he continues: 
This need not be the highest sacrifice (virtue, honour, life, whatever). It 
could be just taking advantage of the opportunity to add one dollar to 
one's gas bill as a contribution towards the fuel costs of the less well-
off. Perhaps, even, on occasion the neutral value silences the reasons 
against, which derive from the agent-relative disvalue. Sometimes, 
however, what would otherwise be a requirement is not one because of 
the presence of agent-relative disvalue. lOS 
If the "sometimes" that agent-relative disvalue has trumping power amounts, 
in the case of martyrdom, to "always," then Dancy's generally flexible position 
still supports his initial concern Dver the recruit and the grenade. 
Surely, we may say, th is is a reasDnable pDsition to come tD? If a Minimal-
Supererogationism concedes GDod->Ought in every case other than martyrdDm, 
then it seems that we have established the "altruistically freighted morality,,'09 
sought by Anti-SupererDgatiDnists. And if we concede the singular example Df 
martyrdom, having proven that there is no reason to place acts like forgiveness or 
generosity in the same category, then we seem to have delineated the 
SupererogatiDnist over-exaggeratiDn, while recognising the one legitimate 
example of absurdity that drove them to theoretical hyperbole. Shall the argument 
rest here then? 
106 That is, his major generally applicable concern. Dancy begins his discussion of Supererogation by 
noting (in Moral Reasons, pp127M 128) that Anti -Supererogationism puts pressure on his "shape" 
metaphor. Suffice it to say that this is a problem internal to his theory. and not a reason that need 
concern anyone else. Dancy has his own theory of Supererogation, which I do not address here, as I 
take the model I develop in the next chapter to pre-empt it. 
101 Moral Reasons , p 14 J . 
tnS Moral Reasons, p 142. 
I09Traditjoo and Modernity, p67. 
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I think not. I see two reasons not to accept even Minimal-Supererogationism 
just yet. The first is a development of Gyekye's worry that Supererogationists 
assert "that only a few human beings have the capacity to practice such basic 
virtues as love, charity, benevolence, and sensitivity to the needs of others."11O 
While the Minimal-Supererogationist is talking about the most exceptional human 
virtue rather than the most basic, I see a strand of the same worry here. That is, if 
the martyr is exempt from obligation because self-sacrifice can meaningfully be 
said not to be the greatest good, then it is hard to see why she is right or rational 
in doing so. We may well be grateful to the martyr who brings about a good for 
us, but if we treat this action as supererogatory we are at the same time claiming 
that their reasons for doing so are opaque to us. This seems unsatisfactory. In the 
moral hermeneutics we use to impart the concept of heroic self-sacrifice - our 
stories, movies, comic books and various other morality plays - we do not portray 
acts of martyrdom as the unfathomable actions of characters with opaque 
intentions. Rather, when the muscle-bound hero strains his last to hold the 
burning beam, telling the teacher to save herself and the orphans, we are intended 
to see such actions as a natural and reasonable response to such extraordinary 
circumstances. To cordon-off even this one extraordinary type of act as 
supererogatory is to make the same mistake Wolf does, treating any act of 
extraordinary goodness as external to rationality . 
Of course, many or most acts of martyrdom may not be rational - a casual 
skim of a Dictionary of Hagiography will likely net a fair number of delusional or 
insane individuals and history is littered with the tragedies of jihadis and 
crusaders whom we judge to have failed to properly consider the justification for 
their actions - but what is at stake here is the question of whether it can ever be 
fully rational to sacrifice oneself. When the recruit throws himself on a grenade, 
the man on a sinking ship forgoes the lifeboat so that others might escape, or the 
student stands in front of an advancing tank, we want to be able to say that their 
actions were rationally explicable pursuits of the good and not just an ultimately 
beneficial misca lculation. As such, something chafes about simply accepting even 
a Minimal-Supererogationism, and if it can ever be the case that self-sacrifice is, 
in fact, the best and most rational thing for the agent to do, then acts of 
martyrdom are not supererogatory. 
IZOTradjtjoD and Modernity, p74. 
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The second reason not to rest with Minimal-Supererogationism is that it 
assumes something that has yet to be proven: that there can be no greater good for 
the individual, in any situation, than her own continued existence. While it 
certainly seems reasonable to assume, prima facie, that the evaporation of the 
context for experiencing any value negates the motive for value-oriented 
behaviour, the question of whether anything can be worth dying for will depend 
on the nature of our substantive account of axiology and cannot be settled prior to 
developing such an account. 
An account of the role and nature of Axiology and how it can drive us toward 
other-directed goods is the work of the next two chapters, and I will return to the 
question of Minimal-Supererogation after developing it. For the present, I take 
my concerns about Minimal-Supererogationism to be sufficient reason to question 
whether even martyrdom counts as an instance of supererogation. 
Conclusion 
I have argued for an Anti-Supererogationist position that circumvents the 
negative arguments presented by Supererogationists, while incorporating the 
benefits they propose to hold on to through supererogation. Since these negative 
arguments constituted the only reason for rejecting Good->Ought, there no 
longer seems to be any reason to limit the definition of Good categorically, 
allowing for a far greater pressure toward altruism than Heyd's "relaxed" 
approach, without sacrificing virtuous praxis. While a possible exception to this 
account may be a Minimal-Supererogationism, which exempts all acts of 
martyrdom, this has yet to be conclusively proven. 
Chapter 3 
Axiology. Kantian Virtue. and Eudaimonism 
Introduction 
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In the previous chapter I argued, pace the Supererogationists, that a robust ethical 
system can be developed without contradiction from the assumption that Good 
implies Ought. This is problematic for Supererogationists, as the argument for their 
position amounts to little more than denying that such a model can be coherent. I 
begin this chapter by examining the relation Supererogationists must assert between 
values and oughts and showing that their account of this relation is unnecessary, 
problematic and under-describes the source of normative force. If any comprehensive 
ethical model must incorporate an account of axiology, as my Anti-Supererogationist 
outline explicitly does, then so much the worse for Supererogationism. 
I then examine the possibility that a Kantian Virtue Theory may be sufficiently 
sensitive to axiology to accommodate the Lesbian Rule, without reducing moral 
oughts to axiology alone . Although such a model would not necessarily favour 
Supererogation ism over Anti-Supererogationism, it may allow scope for 
Supererogationists to rally a defence within the redoubt of Deontology. In response, I 
argue that even a sufficiently nuanced account of Deontology still cannot answer the 
Immoralist, who seeks prudential justification for oughts . Eudaimonism can answer 
the Immoralist, by casting oughts as responses to values (through the eudaimon felos). 
As such, the most comprehensive account of axiology will be shown to support Anti-
Supererogation ism unambiguously. 
Supererogatjonists and Axiology 
Supererogationists cannot concede that Axiology is a sufficient basis for moral 
imperatives, as this is equivalent to "Good->Ought." As such they are committed to a 
distinction between oughts and axiology (the values present in a situation), that is, if 
anything is to be a good without an imperative to bring it about, then imperatives must 
come from some source other than the Good. The most popular alternative source is 
Kantian Deontology, which claims that moral imperatives can only legitimately be 
motivated by the pursuit of duty for its own sake, but Supererogationists do not 
explicitly limit their claims to the Deontological context. Heyd argues that 
Supererogation is broadly plausible in some form across all ethical traditions. All 
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traditions must therefore be read as "quasi-deontological" III to accommodate 
Supererogation. But it is not apparent that we must read them this way to be coherent. 
While the claim that contradicting Supererogation ism collapses into incoherence did 
provide the force of Hey d's argument, Supererogationists do not have recourse to this 
move after my Chapter 2. Unless there is some other reason to exclude Axiology as 
sufficient, Supererogationists are thus forced to open the playing field and pit their 
Deontology ("quasi-" or otherwise) against models in which "Good->Ought" is a 
perfectly natural premise. 
Heyd's case for excluding Axiology as sufficient is not promising. He defines the 
exemplar of Axiology, Classical Virtue Ethics, as "external(ly],,112 incompatible with 
supererogation, since it fails to meet the condition of "correlativity," IJ3 which 
requires that supererogatory actions must transcend specific duties and therefore 
cannot be coherent in a context that does not partake of the language of duties . 
Astoundingly, this is used to support his claim that: 
Such a theory .... can hardly be called anti-supererogationist, for although it 
does not recognise the theoretical or moral importance of supererogation, it 
does not deny it either. II' 
While Aristotle would certainly have been pre-emptive to deny a category 
formalised seventeen centuries after his own, contemporary Axiologists are far better 
placed to do so and, as I have argued, have no reason to recognise supererogation as 
being of any theoretical or moral importance at all. Heyd's exclusion of purely 
axiological accounts on the basis of their failure to meet the correlativity condition is 
telling, however. In doing so, he excludes Axiological models on the grounds that 
they do not support Supererogationism. In fairness to Heyd, this is not circular in the 
context of his argument, as he is not using the various conceptions of Supererogation 
to prove its plausibility. He takes that to have already been done by his arguments for 
Supererogation simpliciter. Rather, his stated aim in examining various theories is "to 
investigate what type of theory can best accommodate the phenomenon of 
supererogatoryacts."IIS 
III Supererogatjoll, p5. 
112 Supererogatjon, p49. 
\l3 Supereroeatjoo, p5. 
114 Superero~atiQn p36. Italics in original. 
liS Supererogation, plO . 
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This does not absolve Heyd entirely however. The first part of his work consists of 
his survey of the major ethical theories, developing his account of Supererogation 
simpliciter and (finally) its justification in the latter part. This seems somewhat odd, 
as one would expect a definitive work on a concept to begin by justifying and 
defining it, before moving on to apply it in different contexts. Despite his stated aim 
of merely searching for the best fit for Supererogation, it therefore seems that Heyd 
aims, at least partly, to demonstrate the broad plausibility of the idea, removing the 
suspicion that anyone need be Anti-Supererogationist simply in order to defend a 
specific model. But Heyd ' s examination of the major ethical theories cannot be used, 
by anyone, to make the concept of Supererogation more plausible, precisely because it 
avoids purely axiological models - even to the extent of reading Virtue as "quasi-
deontological" 116 _ since " in classical ethics the idea of supererogation has to be built 
into the theory by way ofreconstruction.,, 117 Without recourse to the arguments 
despatched in my second chapter, it seems then that Supererogationists who follow 
Heyd in excluding purely Axiological accounts would be acting too quickly. 
There is another sense in which Heyd acted too quickly, even by his own lights, 
and it suggests how pervasive axiology may be. As noted above, Heyd considers 
Axiology "external" 118 to Supererogation ism because it fails to provide a discrete set 
of duties to transcend, but this need not be the case. As Gyekye ' s model shows, rights 
and duties can be derived from an axiological basis without claiming that this 
instrumental deontology exhausts the realm of the moral. Such an account would be 
"internally" 119 incompatible with Supererogation ism inasmuch as it could furnish a 
set of duties hypothetically available to be transcended, without needing to define 
non-dutiful actions as extra-dutiful (as these could simply be cast as direct responses 
to the values of a situation). This is problematic for Supererogationists, as they can no 
longer assume that the corpus of rules, duties, or law-like imperatives that identify a 
moral system as "quasi-deontological" 120 imply that it is not basically Axiological. 
Moreover, Gyekye's example is suggestive because it raises the question of 
whether it can be coherent to talk about moral imperatives at all without making 
reference to axiology. This is to move from the claim "we can use rules in a system 
116 SupereroeatjoD, p5. 
111 Supererogation, p49 . 
I II Supererogation, p49 
11 9 Supererogation, p49 
120 Supererogation, p5 . 
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based on responding to value" to the question "Can we have rules outside of a system 
based on responding to value?" 
The Irredycibility of Axiology 
In denying the sufficiency of Axiology as a source of oughts, Supererogationists 
require the support of a particularly strong form of Deontology: duty must be 
necessary and sufficient to explain why we ought to do something, with the good an 
additional, practically non-moral, bonus consideration. Of course, duty as necessary 
and sufficient for moral normativity is precisely the conventional depiction of Kantian 
Deontology, so this may not appear problematic. However, it is important to note that 
even Kant's own argument for duty does not exclude a place for the Good, and a 
closer inspection will show that some role for values is presupposed by any coherent 
deontology. 
Kant's formulation does not appear to leave much room for interpretation - as 
Barbara Herman notes of his argument in the Groundworkfor the Metaphysics of 
Morals - he is "careful enough about the cases and quite clear about his conclusion: 
an act has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty." l21 But the 
reason for this strict limitation is interesting. On Herman's account, what makes 
"performing a dutiful actfor the sake of duty" 122 superior to any other motive for 
performing such an act is the reliability of such a motive. While selfish cooperation or 
sympathy can both motivate acting according to duty, neither is sufficient to focus the 
agent ' s interest on " the moral rightness of his actions."'" This is so, Kant and Herman 
maintain, because selfish cooperation "when it leads to dutiful actions ... does so only 
for circumstantial reasons,,,l" and "while sympathy can give an interest in an action 
that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." 1" 
What is pertinent here is that duty reaches its place of prominence in the prototype 
Deontological model by virtue of its instrumental value in getting us reliably to the 
right act. While other motives can bring about situations with the same outcomes (put 
another way, the same values), only by pursuing duty for it's own sake are we 
motivated to pay sufficient attention to the requirements of the right action to be sure 
ilI On the Value of Acting/rom the Motive of DUly, in her The Practice arMara! Jud gement, Harvard 
University Press, 1996, pI. 
122 On the Value oj ActingJrom the Motive oJDllty , p3.ltalics in original. 
123 On the Value oj ActingJrom the Motive oj Duty, p6. 
'" On the Value oj ActingJrom the Motive oj Duty, p3. 
'" On the Value oj ActingJrom the Motive oj Dllty, p5. My Italics. 
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of achieving it with significant regularity. This does not exclude the possibility that 
the right action is an under-described kind of Good value, in fact, it leaves the motive 
for pursuing the right action effectively untouched. Kant's reason for placing duty in 
such a central position was procedural (it grounds the introduction of the Categorical 
Imperative) and does not in itself exclude a role for the pursuit of value as the initial 
driver in ethics. So at this meta-level at least, the possibility is left open that the Right 
reduces to the Good, and Kant was simply transfixed by the elegantly compulsive 
power of acting for duty and was aided by later generations of Deontologists in 
fetishizing it out of proportion to its actual role, allowing Supererogationists to 
comfortably assume that Duty amounted to all of normativity. 
How significant a lacuna is this? Granting that we must have some urge to pursue 
the right in the first place and that that is best explained in terms of responding to 
values, does any of this change that pursuing the good is basically Deontological? 
More to the Supererogationist's point, if wanting to pursue the right is a prerequisite 
of any ethical model and everything else comes down to Deontology, then what does 
he need to concede to Axiology? 
Here the answer is that values are not merely present and pertinent at the level of 
our initial motivations to pursue eth ical behaviour [more on this later) , but in each 
situation we are faced with as agents and in those non-actual situations we evaluate as 
alternatives. 
The naively Deontic perspective favoured by Supererogationists casts the positive 
or negative values present in moral situations merely as the transparent medium 
through which the dutiful agent moves in pursuit of her duty. Neat as this is when our 
aim is understanding duties, it is worth looking at the axiological system that lends the 
Kantian her buoyancy. To this end, it is illustrative to parallel the Kantian agent 
pursuing duty with Kwame Appiah's account of the Hobbesian pursuing glory. 
Discussing Ihe reach of cuirurai conceptions of identity, Appiah notes that; 
Some of the most individualist of individuals value such things. 
Hobbes spoke of the desire for glory as one of the dominating impulses 
of human beings, one that was bound to make trouble for social life. 
But glory can consist in fitting and being seen to fit into a collective 
history, and so, in the name of glory, one can end up doing the most 
social things of all. I " 
The Hobbesian is motivated by glory, but glory cannot be understood 
independently of the cultural construction of "what is glorious." Similarly, the 
44 
Kantian is motivated by duty, understood as " that maxim that I could will to have 
applied universally." But "what I could will" cannot be understood independently of 
values presented by situations, because the reasons for willing things are only going to 
be coherent relative to whether they turn out to be good or bad, that is, relative to 
axiological criteria. While the Hobbesian may be motivated by the pursuit of glory, 
that statement by itself is far too spare to amount to anything. A proper description of 
the sorts of actions he will actually accept or reject on the basis of seeking glory will 
be tied up with the particular expressions he understands glory to have. Analogously, 
the Kantian would be under-described simply as pursuing her duty, as the sorts of 
things she could will to be universally applied are not derived from her duty, but from 
the values they present. 127 As such, axiological evaluation seems essential to 
understanding any given deontological motivation and attempts to describe an action 
in purely deontic terms seem insufficient. 
Here the strict Deontologist may respond that while the Hobbesian glory seeker 
(let's call him Rudyard) may not be properly describable to another person without 
making reference to the pal1icular formulations of glory available to him, he knows 
what formulation he is using and how it is applied. It isn't the description of the 
situation that matters here . What we're looking for is the proper description of the 
agent's own moral motivation. So it is more than sufficient, for Rudyard, that he be 
motivated by glory and the particulars of what constitutes that glory are going to be 
incidental to the issue of his motivation. Analogously, though we may need to make 
reference to the values in the situation to properly describe the duty/maxim that the 
Kantian is responding to, that agent herself only needs to understand how they relate 
to the Categorical Imperative to act properly. 
The counter-response must be that this is not a thorough enough picture of what 
the moral agent does. The Kantian agent has to have a clear understanding of the 
situation in order to understand whether she is going wrong. Rudyard cannot just 
126 Identity, Authenticity, Survival in Multicultyralism· Examinjo£ the Politics ofRecQgnjtjoo, Charles 
Taylor/Amy Gutmann (eds), Princeton University Press, 1994, p160. 
127 I am not arguing that values in the Kantian case are purely culturally constructed, merely that "duty" 
is analogous to "glory" in being context-dependent. 
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know that he ought to seek glory, and apply that via his culturally-constructed 
conceptions of what is glorious - he needs to be interrogating those constructions too, 
lest he be fooled into doing something in the name of glory that is , in fact, contrary to 
the nature of glory. In the same way, the Kantian cannot simply be following the 
Categorical Imperative and applying that through those values that happen to pertain 
in a given situation - in every instance she has to examine the values presented by the 
situation, in order to properly understand what the implications are, and whether what 
may superficially seem to entail a world she could will turns out, on proper appraisa l, 
to invoke some complication she would not will to be universal. Put another way, 
following the Categorical Imperative may allow a number of actions that, prima facie, 
seem to amount to worlds she could will, but not all of these possible worlds are 
equivalent. Some may entail worlds she would not wish to see universalised , but, in 
order to determine the difference, she will have to evaluate the values themselves, not 
just apply the categorical im perative through them. 
This does not assume that the Kantian is trying to generate rules she can fo llow in 
future. Kantians are not looking for a way to generate a personal body of law. Rather, 
maxims are law-like in that the criterion for evaluating them is the hypothetical " if 
this were to be a universal law," but that is just a standard against which to evaluate 
individual actions . There may be nothing wrong with acting on an under-specified 
maxim. Technically, if she stops to think about it, she will realise that universalising 
the maxim as formulated would not be the sort of thing she could will to be the case, 
but, as it happens, in this case, no negative side-effects spring up and in future she 
will make sure to formulate more carefully. If Kant would insist that we check the 
formulation of our maxims thoroughly enough to avoid this, then we clearly need to 
evaluate the values of any given situation in order to avoid making such a mistake and 
axiology needs to be a part of the picture. On the other hand, ifhe would not expect so 
much work, then it seems that the relevance of invoking the Categorical Imperative 
hinges not on its rigour at maxim-generating, but on its capacity to provide the right 
values, in which case, axiology clearly belongs in the picture. Either way, an account 
of Deontology that pretends it can be independent of axiology is going to be under-
describing both moral evaluation and moral motivation. 
Axiology, then, is not merely allowed for, but seems to be a necessary part of any 
ethical description . But axiology is not just necessarily present in ethical descriptions 
(that could have been true even if values were merely a detail needed to enact duties) 
46 
It is necessarily present without reducing to Deontology. That is, precisely because 
any potential application of the Categorical Imperative must be evaluated with 
reference to values, axiological assessments are prior to Deontological ones and thus 
cannot reduce to being merely a function of Deontology. This leaves no support for 
the naively Deontic model on which Supererogation ism rests - if Axiology is a 
necessary and irreducible part of any moral evaluation, then Deontology cannot be a 
sufficient source of moral imperatives. This, then, is the sense in which the 
Supererogationist conception of the source of moral normativity is problematic - by 
ignoring the role of axiological evaluation entirely Supererogationists are not simply 
under-describing moral imperatives, but positing a model that cannot stand on its 
own. 
If we take this as a reason not to adopt the model that Supererogationists must, it is 
also a reason to be happy we have alternatives. What are the alternatives available 
then, if we are to have an account of moral imperatives that properly incorporates 
Axiology? Since any coherent account of moral imperatives must recognise the 
irreducibility of Axiology, it seems that we are left with two options: either 
Deontology and Axiology are both irreducible constituents, or Deontology reduces to 
Axiology. It may seem that a model such as Gyekye's would prefer the latter 
conception: if all duties derive from axiological evaluations, but not all responses to 
value are realised through acting from duties, then it seems that Deontology is best 
cast as a function of Axiology, which has priorityi28. However, there is at least one 
sense in which Deontology seems irreducibly necessary for moral actions. 
While Gyekye's model allows both for conventionally articulated duties and 
Lesbian direct responses to value, there is a minimal sense in which Deontology is 
present even in the latter case. Here it is important to note that even Particularists hold 
that ethical actions must be lawlike, in the sense that an action cannot meaningfully be 
described as " the right thing to do" without being right for any agent in the same 
situation. The Particularist contention is that the particulars of any two situations may 
differ so radically that it may not be coherent to treat the right response as transferring 
from one to the other, but this does not negate the hypothetical lawlike-ness of any 
particular right action. So it is necessary, if "morally right" is to have any non-
subjective meaning, that the right action be expressible as something true for any 
situation presenting the same values, even ifno such configuration of values is ever 
121 In the sense of being prior. 
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repeated. As this requirement is entailed by the need to make moral normativity more 
than merely subjective, it does not reduce to a mere function of pursuing Axiology. 
As noted above, testing for lawlike-ness is a function of Deontology (it seems difficult 
to imagine a more concise formula for testing lawlike-ness than the Categorical 
Imperative, but others may be coherent. It seems that any test for lawlike-ness would 
properly be called Deontological, in this minimal sense). At the very least then, thi s 
minimal Deontology (call it deontology) is both a necessary and an irreducible 
constituent of any moral system. But it need not follow from this deontology that we 
cast the formulation of maxims as a key (or perhaps even necessary) aspect of the 
process, or that moral actions need be (or are best) articulated through duties . That is, 
this minimal deontology need not entail the procedural trappings of Deontology 
proper. 
Having established that the Supererogationist overemphasis on Deontology is 
misplaced, we may ask whether Deontology proper has much to offer at all. 
Kantian Virtue Theory 
While the irreducible requirement of deontology does not require that we employ 
the full trappings of a Kantian Deontology, it is not necessarily excluded as an option 
either. Naturally, any useful formulation of Deontology would have to provide a 
better account of Axiology than the Supererogationist inherently assumes, but it 
seems that even a strictly Kantian reading may allow a proper place for Axiology. 
Onora O'Neill argues for a Virtue Theori29 drawn directly from Kant, which seems 
to place a good deal of emphasis on Axiology, expressed through "imperfect 
duties ."' JO While perfect duties map those instances in which the precise action 
required is clearly entailed and externally enforceable, imperfect duties are less 
specific, though no less imperative. Identifying such duties with virtue, O'Neill 
explains that: 
A principle of action that cannot be tied down to specific acts must, of 
course, still have some content, but this content may be given by 
constraining the end of action, rather than by more specific 
prohibitions or prescriptions. Principles of virtue will be maxims of 
L29 Kant 's Virtues, in How ShQuld One Liye?' Essays on the Virtyes, Roger Crisp (ed), Oxford 
University Press, 1996, pp77-99. 
130 Kant's Virtues, p83 . 
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ends, rather than of action; their enactment will be revealed in action in 
highly varied ways."! 
In such situations, mapping the appropriate enactment of the correct end clearly 
requires analysis beyond merely what can be provided by the Categorical Imperative, 
as O'Neill notes: 
In each case these ends greatly underdetermine action: evidently we cannot do 
all that is needed to achieve [the end] , what we can do will vary with 
circumstance, and in nearly all circumstances there will be many ways of 
meeting the demands of imperfect duty.' 32 
It is clear that the appropriate sort of deeper analysis should be axiological, as the 
ends of imperfect duties are "happiness and perfection"'" (our own and others' 
respectively), which, it seems, must be diagnosed with reference to axiological 
evaluation (in the case of happiness at least, this is almost certainly the only coherent 
way in which it can be described). Conceding the necessity of axiological evaluation 
to imperfect duty need not eliminate the role of duty, or analysis in terms of duty. 
Kantian Virtue Theorists like O'Neill may concede that axiological evaluations are 
necessary to ethical evaluation and action, but this is not the same as conceding that 
Axiology is the important part of the process. Here they may say "Of course value-
analysis and the desirability of outcomes factor, but values will vary from one case to 
the next. What is constant from one case to another is maxim-based Deontology. This 
is the algorithm for doing it right and the bit about what we could will to be the case is 
the black box that houses whatever value-analyses are relevant in one case or 
another." That is, such a Virtue Theorist would allow for an account of the sorts of 
values we would wish to pursue (and thus, could will to have universally applied), 
while maintaining that the ethical focus belongs on the maxim-generating algorithm, 
since it is only by applying this algorithm that we can reliably reach valuable 
situations. 
Incorporating Axiology in this way underwrites importing useful Virtue 
terminology. Axiologically-derived values are pursued through cu ltivating the 
character, specifically by encouraging particular complex dispositions of character 
(virtues) and discouraging others (vices). The focus of traditional Kantian 
J3I Kant 's Virtues, p87. 
132 Kant 's Virtues. p8S. 
m Kant's Virtues, p87. 
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consideration can thus be extended to the idea of becoming the sort of person who is 
reliably just (the phronemos) by applying rational deliberation (prohairesis). 
These virtue terms are justified Deontologically: prohairesis is understood in terms 
of universalisable maxims and the phronemos as the most dutiful sort of person to be. 
Vicious predispositions would include acting from sympathy or selfish-cooperation, 
as well as dispositions explicitly against dutiful actions, while virtuous predispositions 
would be defined in terms of the proper relation to duty. Working from a 
Deontological focus , such a Virtue Theory could be sufficiently flexible to respond to 
values (properly understood in terms of their teleological implications), and allow a 
re-heirarchising of maxims unique to those situations (a Kantian application of the 
Lesbian Rule). This seems sufficiently nuanced to meet the requirements ofa robust 
Anti-Supererogationist system outlined in the previous chapter and to include a 
ceteris paribus pressure toward the Good, understood through imperfect duties. It 
seems then that a Virtue Theory account of Kant ian Deontology not only bypasses the 
simplistic Deontological-monism assumed by Supererogationists, it positively 
promotes Anti-Supererogationism. 
Kantian Virtue Theory may not necessarily lead to Anti-Supererogationism. While 
it seems that a properly rigorous account of Axiology is going to make naive 
Supererogationism untenable, the Kantian emphas is on duty may leave recourse to 
Qualified-Supererogationism, that is, a practically Supererogationist system derived 
from an Anti-Supererogationist axiology. What I have in mind here is not a specific 
move captured by a specific model, but a general loophole left open by the Kantian 
approach. Though it may be realisable through various arguments, the broad-strokes 
outline is as follows: A Kantian model casts duty as the predominant of the two 
irreducible ethical constituents and in so doing makes duty the predominant Good. So 
the Good-motivated-by-duty (the Right) could be prioritised over the merely-Good, 
perhaps to the extent that the merely-Good is insufficient to make an action required. 
Although any specific argument for a Qualified-Supererogationist reading of 
Kantian Virtue Theory may have a specific response, it seems that some formulation 
of this argument will seem plausible as long as adherence to duty is seen as the 
primary constituent of ethical action. Were such a model to hold, it would seem to 
suggest that Supererogation ism, in its qualified form at least, is in fact coherent and is 
a necessary part of any complete ethical system. 
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Without pretending that this conclusion is evidence of a reductio ad absurdum, the 
suspicious provenance of the concept of Supererogation ism noted in Chapter I may 
yet lead us to ask whether we need concede this much. There may be some other 
reason to reject a model which seems to lead us to Supererogation ism. Such a reason 
seems to present itself .... 
Duly, the Immoralist. and Eudaimonism 
However flexible she may be, the Kantian Virtue Theorist is committed to 
Deontology (rather than mere deontology) by committing to the claim Barbara 
Herman found so clear in Kant, that "an act has moral worth if and only if it is done 
from the motive of duty."' " Interpreted axiologically, duty is seen by the Deontologist 
as an indispensable mechanism for reaching the Good, but if the value of duty is that 
it connects us to the Good, then surely it is dispensable in those situations in which we 
are already aware of the Good (via our axiological evaluations)? The Kantian is 
committed to denying this, arguing that, for the good to be reliably reached, we must 
be motivated by a love of acting consistently from duty, even where it overrides our 
own interests. Here we come to the crux question: " Why should we be motivated by a 
love of acting consistently when it overrides our own interest?" 
This is the question of why we ought to be moral at all, the question asked by the 
Immoralist, the first interlocutor of ethics. Thus far I have glossed over it, qualifying 
it earlier with the rhetorical concessions "Granting that we must have some urge to 
pursue the right in the first place" and "if wanting to pursue the right is a prerequisite 
of any ethical model, " but such assumptions cannot, and must not be taken for granted 
in ethics. While we may need to assume a desire for the moral in order to make any 
progress toward a coherent moral system, this assumption can only be provisional. 
The Immoralist's question is a coherent one, and does not go away. Where the 
Kantian answer to "What ought I do?" will , in every case, be that we ought to perform 
the dutiful act "for the sake of duty, ,, '" the Immoralist will ask why this is a good 
answer. While it is obvious that I should perform the act suggested by duty when it 
benefits me to do so, why should I always be dutiful , even when it does not benefit 
me, or is positively against my interests? Why should I be dutiful, rather than 
conniving, self-interested, or pragmatic? The Kantian response is to suggest that such 
'" On the Value of Actingfrom the MOlive of Dilly, pI. 
135 On Ihe Value of Acting from the MOlive of Dilly, p3 . Italics in original. 
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behaviour is irrational, but this seems too easily dismissive. The concerns of the agent 
in a Prisoners' Dilemma seem perfectly rational (and suggesting otherwise seems like 
adding insult to injury). Moreover, calling the Immoralist irrational does not serve to 
end the conversation as effectively as Kantians may think, since the Immoralist still 
has recourse to ask "If consistent rationality is against my interests, why should I 
apply my rationality in the particularly consistent manner required by duty?" This is 
persistence bordering on belligerence and at this point in the conversation hands are 
thrown in the air and accusations of circularity are made. Surely the Immoralist sees 
that asking for a rational reason to be rational presupposes the value of rationality? 
The spade must turn here or the conversation ends, since denying rationality leaves no 
common ground. 
This fails to credit the full force of the position. The Immoralist is not suggesting 
that all rationality be abandoned, but asking how it can be rational to act against our 
own interests. This is a valid and coherent question, within the scope of rationality. It 
is not an unanswerable question, but it is not a question addressed by the Kantian 
response, and cannot be properly addressed if it is fobbed off as irrational whenever 
raised. "Why be moral?" is rather a large question to leave unanswered though, and 
there is something blithely Damoclean about the Kantian response that should bother 
us. 
Since the Immoralist is the first interlocutor of ethics, the question has been tackled 
in other ways. Roger Crisp provides an account of the question as posed in Classica l 
Virtue Ethics: 
Near the beginning of Book Two of Plato ' s Republic, Glaucon tells 
Socrates the story of Gyges, the Lydian shepherd said to have found a 
ring which made him invisible when he turned the stone: with the help 
of the ring, Gyges seduced the king ' s wife and took over the kingdom. 
Glaucon suggests that any sensible person would do the same. Socrates 
is challenged to show that a life of justice - broadly speaking, a life of 
virtue - is preferable to one of injustice ... the Republic can be read as 
a response to Glaucon's challenge. 136 
Not just the Republic, but Classical Virtue Ethics , in general, can be read as a 
response to Glaucon ' s challenge, that is, as a response to the Immoralist. [n taking the 
Immoralist as providing a serious challenge demanding response, Virtue thus differs 
116 How Should One Liye?- Essays on the Virtues, Oxford University Press , 1996, p9. My italics. 
from Kantianism and if Kant dismisses the Immoralist too quickly, this must 
recommend a Virtue Ethical approach. And the approach taken by Classical Virtue 
Ethics is interesting in that it answers the Immoralist on his own terms, while 
justifying the commitment to actions beyond the merely self-serving. 
Crisp continues to describe Socrates ' response in The Republic: 
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It would not suffice for him to argue that justice pays in the sense that 
it increases the likelihood of one's obtaining the sort of goods pursued 
by Gyges. So Socrates argues instead that Gyges had a quite mistaken 
view of what his own happiness consisted in. Happiness is not sex, 
wealth and power, but, partly at least, justice itself. 137 
There is, of course, a name for a position that argues at the level of Axiology, 
justifying one value or set of values over others with reference to what happiness 
ultimately amounts to - Eudaimonism. Aristotle is the exemplar of eudaimonism, and 
Terry Eagleton casts his axiologically-framed approach as follows: 
For Aristotle ... acting well was a reward in itself. You no more 
expected a reward for it than you did for enjoying a delectable meal or 
taking an early morning swim. It is not as though the reward for virtue 
is happiness ; being virtuous is to be happy .... Aristotle also thought 
that if you did not act well, you were punished not by hell fire or a 
sudden bolt from heaven, but by having to live a damaged, crippled 
life. 138 
This is addressing the Immoralist in terms he can accept: what justifies a course of 
action is that it is valuable in itself, rewarding in precisely that sense alluded to by 
Immoralists. This sometimes involves sacrificing certain forms of pleasure or 
comfort, but this is coherent precise ly because we are pursuing complex dispositional 
states that are valuable in themselves, and more so than alternatives. The 
paradigmatic metaphor for eudaimonia is health, and it is easy to see why. If the 
Immoralist were to ask why we spend agonising hours at the gym every day when we 
could spend the same time relaxing and eating junk food, the Kantian may be seen as 
responding by rolling her eyes and exhaling that "If you don't see why going to the 
gym matters then there's no point in talking to you." 
In How Sbould One Live? p9. 
'" Terry Eagleton, After Theory, Penguin Books, 2004 (2003), ppI16-117. 
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By contrast, the Eudaimonist notes that being healthy is a good in itself and a 
deeper, more rewarding sort of good than the pleasure of junk food. While we could 
say that we have some sort of duty to keep ourselves fit, this is already one thought 
too many. That health and fitness are the sorts of things they are is a sufficient answer 
for anyone to understand why they ought to be pursued."· This is not to dismiss the 
questioner with accusations of irrationality; if the Immoralist (or the couch-potato) 
wish to forgo the greater Good they are free to do so, but the question of how some 
sacrifice of self-interest can be rational has been met. This response therefore answers 
the question in a way that will satisfy the questioner, even ifhe is not himself 
convinced to join us at the gym (though if he concedes the self-evident value of 
health, he is most likely hesitant due an alcratic love of junk food). Of course, the 
Immoralist may not be convinced by the argument that some specific virtuous 
behaviour conduces toward his eudaimonia, but eudaimonism is speaking a language 
he can be convinced in, arguing that Oughts are simply prudential. 
One line open to the Deontologist is to say that she can justify duty along the same 
lines and that is obviously what is intended by asserting the primacy oflogical 
consistency, it is best/or us to be consistent. This after all, was Herman's justification 
for the priority of duty. But this does not quite get off the ground. It seems that where 
Kant appeals to axiology to back his Deontology up, it is done in the genera l sense. 
The claim defending duty would be something like "Living and acting consistently 
lead to a good life." But this is a tricky empirical claim. It is not apparent a prori that 
consistent rationality as deployed through universalisable maxims aims at a good life, 
or the best life, in every case. 
By contrast, the standard eudaimonism sets for accepting or discarding any - and 
every individual - course of action is precisely whether it conduces to the Good Life, 
that is, whether it does in fact lead to values we would want to pursue. So, if there is a 
sense in which Kantianism offers an axiological grounding for Deontology, it is far 
weaker than the eudaimonist model and is unlikely to convince the Immoralist. 
We may take the Immoralist to be a fundamentalist Axiologist, asking the most 
fundamentally axiological question at every stage. Eudaimonism is capable of and 
committed to answering this question at every stage, while Kantian Deontology (even 
a Kantian Deontology deployed through Virtue Theory) is not. Since the Immoralist's 
m Eagleton says the same of explaining why we want to live on his p 116, noting that "It is as 
superfluous to explain why you want to live as it is to explain why you donlt enjoy being nuzzled all 
over by buzzards." 
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question is neither insignificant to nor easily dismissed by any ethical model, 
Eudaimonism's more rigorous Axiology seems clearly to provide us with reason to 
prefer it. While accommodating and surpassing the axiological flexibility of Kantian 
Virtue Theory, a Eudaimonist Virtue Ethic does not leave the same scope for 
Qualified-Supererogationism. 
The Appeal of Eudaimonism 
In allowing us to meet the Immoralist on his own terms, Eudaimonism presents 
itself as a more attractive Axiological system than the most familiar directly-
axiological model , Utilitarianism. I have left Utilitarianism undiscussed since noting, 
in the previous chapters, that I find Williams' objection from integrity to be 
convincing - and for precisely that reason. If Utilitarianism cannot explain why I 
ought to favour the Global Good over my integrity in general, it certainly cannot face 
up to the stronger line held by the Immoralist. This is not to say that we do not have a 
conclusive prudential investment in the common (perhaps even Global) Good, but any 
arguments for such an investment will, it seems to me, be Eudaimonist, rather than 
distinctively Utilitarian. 
An additional reason to recommend Eudaimonism as the model on which we 
construct our axiological response is that the narrative of my eudaimon te/os provides 
a constant against which to order seemingly incommensurable values. The question of 
incommensurability arises, to borrow Dancy's evocative example, '40 when we ask 
whether, in pursuing Martin Luther' s desiderata - wine, women, and song - a surplus 
of one can be a compensation in kind for the absence of another. Without 
presupposing the contentious claim that "different values are in fact covert forms of 
the same value,"'41 Eudaimonism provides a rationale for ranking them, relative to 
their contribution to the essential value, eudaimonia. (Note that eudaimonia does not 
explain how we ought to hierarchise any specific set of values, it merely notes that 
there is always a compelling reason to do so and points us toward the yardstick 
necessary to make such a decision. Although not overwhelmingly instructive, this is 
no different to the situation we are confronted with in any other Particularist 
scenario.) 
140 Moral Reasons, p 122. 
14 J Mora! Reasons , p 122 . 
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Another advantage, from the perspective of constructing a comprehensive Anti-
Supererogationist model , is that understanding all Goods as ultimately prudential pre-
empts the move Dancy makes in justifying Supererogation. Here he says "that where 
we are required to make a sacrifice, the status of this requirement is constructed on the 
triad of neutral value, agent-relative value and special relationship (opportunity 
etc.)."'42 On a Eudaimanist axiology, "neutral" and "agent-relative" value amount to 
the same thing at different scales (and anything which is not both is a disvalue), so 
this prima facie evaluative mechanism will generate a pressure toward the general 
good. This further emphasises the point that the only form of Supererogationism 
Dancy can support is the Minimal-Supererogationism, which exempts martyrdom 
(assuming that is correct). 
Finally, it is useful to examine the conception of what "Ought" means on an 
Axiological account. On a superficial reading, much of what ! have argued so far may 
seem to run afoul ofHume's Law,'43 that is, that we cannot derive an Ought from a 
factual description. It may seem that Eudaimonism is making !s->Ought claims like 
"X is a life of a certain sort, which entails that you should value it," but this would be 
a superficial reading indeed. A better description of what is happening here is to say 
that a factual claim is being made about how certain states imply other states, that is, 
those things we find valuable are, or depend on, factually describable states of the 
world. Such states stand in relation to others - they depend on, entail, exclude and are 
constituted by certain other states. As it happens, we attach value to some of these 
states and disvalue to others. Without any sleight-of-hand, we are thus able to 
generate true conditional statements of the form "If you value X, then you will value 
Y." There is a pressure toward the valuable here, but it is not being slipped in 
mysteriously - it was there from the beginning. Finding something valuable just 
means that you think it is pursuit-worthy, that you recognise and respond to a tropism 
toward it. It is rational to pursue what is valuable and irrational to pursue disvalue -
and this is apparent at the most basic, prudential level of our rational functioning. 
"Ought," then, is just a convenient shorthand for "it is rational to pursue this in 
light of some other thing you pursue." Obviously, ought-claims only have any force if 
you already value some other thing, but, as Eagleton's talk of delightful swims and 
buzzards indicates, it happens to be the case that we do value certain things and shun 
142 Moral Reasons, p142. 
14J See The Oxford Dictjonary ofPbjlosopby, Simon Blackburn, Oxford University Press, 1994, pISO. 
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others and share a good many of these evaluations with others, which is useful (given 
that our capacity to communicate probably stems from this common context), if 
unsurprising (given our similarities at a basic level). It may well be interesting to 
ponder why we find things va luable at all (this is the realm of functionalist 
evolutionary thinking), but it is meaningless to look for reasons why we ought to 
value anything outside of the context of other things we value. Values are an 
irreducible feature of our existence, and Oughts rest on no deeper bedrock (nor can 
they). 
Of course, it is a distincti ve feature of moral ought-claims that they are universally 
applicable. That is, their authority derives from being true for everyone. This need not 
be a problem. The Eudaimonist contention is simply that we cannot but value the best 
possible life for ourselves. For those somehow unmoved by their own flourishing, any 
conditional of the form "If you value the good life, then you should avoid X" will be 
insufficient. It is very hard to imagine people who would fai l to be moved by a true 
conditional of this type and if they exist, there is probably good prudential reason for 
the rest of us not to have too much to do with them. 
So "Ought" amounts to a factual claim about valuable states and its normative 
pressure comes from our pre-existing tropism toward the good life . This is a form of 
moral realism, since both our situations and the evaluations we attach to them are 
facts about the world, as are the relations between these and other states. This is as 
much as I will concern myself with the issue of moral realism, as further debate on the 
merits of this position would extend beyond the current project. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Supererogationists must assert a naively simplistic account of 
Axio logy for their position to be coherent, and that any sufficiently detailed account 
of the role of Axiological evaluation in ethics leaves the category of Supererogation 
looking incoherent and unnecessary. Since Axiology is an irreducible constituent of 
any ethical system, this leaves no room for Supererogationists at all. Examining the 
possibility that a Kantian Virtue Theory accommodating Axiology could still give 
sufficient scope to duty to justify Qualified-Supererogationism, I have argued that 
such a model cannot answer the Immoralist's question. Since this question must be 
answered and is best answered by Eudaimonism (which is essentially Axiological), a 
properly rigorous account of Axiology should lead us to adopt a fully Anti-
Supererogationist Eudaimonist Virtue Ethic. 
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Chapter 4 
Eudaimonism and Ubuntu 
Introduction 
In my second chapter, I argued that Good->Ought need not threaten our integrity 
in as many cases as Supererogationists claim, since our teleological interests diffuse 
and become caught up with the greater good. In Chapter 3, I argued that eudaimonism 
is the most convincing account of the good, that is, that the best response to the 
Immoralist sees all goods as our own good in this diffuse way. In this chapter, I will 
provide a more detailed account of how our pursuit of eudaimonia generates a 
powerful pressure toward the good of others and the general good. I will develop an 
account of the positive axiological pressure toward the general good, extending 
Heyd's minimal account of this pressure in terms of the good to the agent. Noting that 
such picture is not quite sufficient to convince the Immoralist to take the good of 
others as her own project, I will turn to the concept umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - that 
being a person requires being a person among others - to provide a sense in which the 
good of others is inherently tied to our own. Seeking the best formulation of this 
concept, I will turn to Pedro Tabensky's account of others as necessary to our 
rationality, and to the value of our relationships with certain others to provide an 
argument capable of convincing the Immoralist that our good requires a commitment 
to the good of others generally. Finally, I will return to the question of Minimal-
Supererogationism and argue that not even martyrdom can be called supererogatory. 
Positive Axiological Pressure 
To understand the pressure toward other-directed goods posited by Anti-
Supererogationism, it will help to return to Heyd 's positive axiological reasons. As I 
noted earlier, without the constraint of arguments for supererogation, these are 
unqualified reasons to pursue other-directed good actions . This is not to say that they 
are always sufficient reason to act. Other goods could still be greater, or more 
realisable, and thus take precedent, but ceteris paribus, they can be sufficient reason 
for action by virtue of being valuable. To recap then, the first reason to value such 
actions was that society requires some self-sacrifice. That is, other-directed good 
actions 
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may contribute to the strengthening of social bonds and augment the 
feelings of a close-knit community, For by doing more than is 
required, a member of a group shows that he has an interest in his 
fellow members which is deeper than his contractual commitments, or 
than the personal benefit he can draw from the group, Consequently, 
the relations between the members of the group become more friendly , 
personal, and based on good will. Benevolence and gratitude enhance 
mutual trust and confidence"" So although theoretically the morality 
of duty is sufficient for securing basic cooperation in society, both 
social cohesion and dignity are conditioned by the willingness of some 
people to transcend", the relations of claims and counter-claims, 144 
And "even if a society (or an institution) could survive if its members no more than 
adhered to the requirements and rules of behaviour, it would be morally deficient," 14' 
since it seems "highly probable that a decline in the spirit of altruism (or volunteering) 
will be accompanied by deep changes in other spheres of human relationship," 146 
The second reason to value such acts was their indirect, hermeneutic value,147 that 
is, since such exemplary acts may inspire others to be similarly altruistic, their value 
in "raising the bar" counts in addition to their direct good value, Heyd, committed to 
emphasising the supererogatory nature of such acts, is perhaps less enthusiastic on 
this point than my description suggests, glossing it: "Although we may not put 
pressure on people " , we may expose them by various means to some standards of 
moral excellence which wou ld make them try to emulate those who live up to such 
standards,"I" Suffice it to say that I think a more detailed picture of the social context 
will justify more emphasis than this lacklustre "inspiration-is-permissible" model 
suggests, but I will come to this in a moment 
It is not simply the case that other-directed good actions are valuable, What is 
noteworthy about them is that the weighting assigned to their value can increase as 
we examine them in the broader contexts of teleology and community, Here I am 
referring to the sort of value-shift that occurs between Prisoner's Dilemma and 
144 Supererogation, p179. 
14~ Supererogation, p 179. 
146 Supercros;atjoo, p 180. The latter quote is from Titmuss' The Gift Relationship, p223. 
147 Supererogation pp 18t ~ 182. 
141 Supererogation p 182. 
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Iterated Prisoner 's Dilemma,14' where the introduction of agents with a memory of 
past actions increases the value of co-operation. Note that I am not, here, committing 
myself to the claim that ethics reduces to Prisoner's Dilemma situations.'" My point 
is simply that an expanded context increases the number of ways in which other-
directed goods can count as good. 
I noted in my second chapter that we have at least two reasons to take a 
teleological standpoint when evaluating actions: that the longer-term consequences or 
goals of an act change its proper description and that, as narrative beings whose teloi 
extend into the future , we favour our teleological identities over our immediate 
identities. In addition, since we are concerned with other-directedness, there is 
significant reason to examine the value of our actions in the context of our shared 
social environment. 
So how does the extension into a shared, teleological context increase the value of 
other-directed goods? Take, for example, my interest in a troubled co-worker's 
personal life . This person (call him Dilbert), clearly in need of attention and 
reassurance, is not a friend , that is, not someone to whom I "owe" care to in a crudely 
contractarian way. In addition, the time and effort I must expend on such a project 
count as a disvalue to me, distracting me from other goods I could pursue (my own, 
for instance, since I have more information about the requirements for my own good, 
I am best placed to pursue these). Having dispensed with the supererogationi st claim 
that there is no reason to say I ought to help, even ifl can, the question now is how 
the good of my co-worker can impinge on me sufficiently to overpower commitment 
to other goods, including my own immediate good. Ifwe examine the positive 
axiological reasons Heyd allows, we see the direct value of the good act to society, 
and the hermeneutic value of promulgating such acts. 
Direct Value: Teleological Investment 
In the case of direct value, seeing ourselves teleologically, as invested in the long-
term, increases the relevance of the general good to ourselves: becoming 
149 Richard Dawkins' account of Prisoner 's Dilemma scenarios (in The Selfi sh Gene, OUP, 1989, 
pp202-233) remains one of the clearest introductions to Game Theory. 
150 J am sympathetic to Peter Danielson's claim that Prisoner's Dilemma "turns out to be especially 
favourable to a moral solution by means of communication, commitment, and an opportunistic minimal 
morality" and may not reflect all of the complexity of real moral situations (in his Artificial Morality' 
YimlOus Robots for Vi rtual Games, Routledge, 1992, p 163). While I do think there is good reason to 
suspect that many moral situations are responsive to communication, commitment, and "moral" 
responses in precisely the manner mapped by Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, it does not follow that all 
moral situations reduce to this particular game. 
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homeowners, for example, increases our investment in the general good of our 
community and becoming shareholders increases our investment in the enterprise. In 
the same way, becoming aware of ourselves as teleological agents increases our 
awareness of an investment in the common good. In Dilbert's case, the cost of 
attending to his problems seems high in the short term, but, seen in the long-term, 
turns into a miniscule investment to secure a long-term good (a more relaxed work 
environment, for example). So while I may feel very little drive to attend to the 
problems of a co-worker in a job I intend to leave within six weeks, my investment 
shifts significantly if I intend to work in the same office for the next decade. 
Before going on, it is worth noting two potential objections to this move. The first 
is that Dilbert's situation was the same regardless of my long-term plans: he was in 
need of assistance and it was within my capacity to help, in both cases. A Utilitarian 
would see no relevant distinction between the two: in either case there is a disvalue it 
is within our power to rectify. Surely this is sufficient reason to act? The second 
objection simply notes that the idea that we have an investment in long-term goods is 
neither new nor profound. 
Regarding the first objection, we have seen that Utilitarians cannot answer the 
Immoralist' s question and I suspect that part of the reason Supererogationists have so 
easily brushed axiological pressure aside in the past is that this Utilitarian objection 
was the only Axiological argument presented. Though Dilbert' s situation does indeed 
cry out for help in either case, the Immoralist's question puts pressure on us to explain 
good actions as rational for the agent to expend resources on, in each case. It seems to 
me that addressing this challenge is both necessary to quell any remaining sympathies 
for Supererogationism and, moreover, the correct approach to the Good. 
As to the second objection, such as it is, while the existence of a broader context 
than our own lives is certainly acknowledged by all systems, it seems to me that few 
enough actually recognise the impact of orienting toward the value in such a context. 
Still shaking off the vestiges of Hobbes ' Leviathan, few theorists seem to pay 
sufficient attention to the key discovery of Game Theory, that complex other-
regarding behaviour arises naturally in a context of iterated interactions. What drives 
such a shift, as we have seen, is that the extended context of iteration increases the 
value of contributions toward the general good, while the disvalues remain fixed. 
Seenfrom the perspective of the long-term investment, the disvalue reduces relative to 
the value generated. Another, suggestive, example of this value-shift is seen in 
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projects such as the Creative Commons'" and Open Source Software'" movements. 
In these cases ubiquitous and all-but free communication emphasises the value of 
cooperation and collaboration, while the value of maintaining copyright remains fixed 
(that is, becomes a disvalue relative to the increased realisable value of collaboration). 
Of course, any model can acknowledge that cooperating towards shared goals at the 
expense of immediate personal benefit is more valuable (for society in general and, on 
average, for each of its members). It is a truism that a system in which people share 
their work freely and cooperate to improve the work of others would generate greater 
value than one in which people pursued their own projects to the detriment of the 
general good. What too many Neo-Hobbesians fail to credit, however, is that such 
systems can develop spontaneously. What Game Theory shares with the Creative 
Commons and Open Source Software movements is that the context of evaluation 
shifted away from isolated instances of loss or gain, toward a greater context (either 
the long-term or the large-scale) . Once the good is understood in this greater context, 
the rationality (and concomitant ought) of orienting toward it becomes apparent. 
This shift may seem familiar to eudaimonists. The idea that cooperation can be 
beneficial, like the notion that each of us can want nothing more than to live the best 
life appears, at first, neither new nor profound. But for all the apparent obviousness of 
the claim, merely acknowledging this fact fails to capture the impact of orienting 
towards this complex, long-term value (eudaimonia). This is not, of course, an 
analogy. The argument here is that the general good is a significant part of my 
eudaimonia, and as such that I have reason to pursue it, which may not have been 
obvious had I been focused on more immediate goods . Recall the analogy of health: 
taking vitamin supplements represents a notable disvalue to me because they absorb 
resources (time and money) which could be spent on other things, and offer no 
commensurate value in the short term. Seen at the level of my general health, 
however, the picture changes. While the disvalue remains fixed as we zoom out, the 
long term value of my continued robust health increases. At the greater scale of my 
life, the disvalue of taking vitamins is so miniscule that it is effectively negated, while 
the value of my general well-being tips the scale. This analogy describes not only my 
eudaimonia generally, but the sh ift in value of my encounter with Dilbert. By shifting 
to the long-term perspective of my telos, the value to me of a stable work-
LSI INWw.creativecommons.org 
IS2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source 
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environment, though almost negligible in the immediate context, counts significantly, 
while the notable immediate disvalue drops off as the scale increases. 
I am not, naturally, claiming that zooming out to the long-term increases the good 
of all acts, or that all cases are like Dilbert's. There are many instances in which 
immediate value drops off markedly as we broaden the scope of examination. The 
pleasure of smoking a cigarette is a paradigm example. There is no reason to exclude 
many sorts of other-directed acts from this category; my attending to Dilbert may 
dissuade him from seeking more professional attention, accidentally validate his 
unfounded aggression toward his wife, or instil a dependence on me that interferes 
significantly with my own good. This is precisely why careful attention to the 
particulars of the situation is necessary, to work out the proper description of the act 
(since being attentive can be an under-described component of both "being-helpful" 
and "validating Dilbert's aggression"). For the purposes of the thought-experiment, 
however, the attention I pay to Dilbert's worries is precisely the action most likely to 
help him. My intention here is to sketch the outlines of how the good of others can 
impinge on us, before arguing for the ubiquity of such situations. 
My point in invoking the long term view of our te/os has been to demonstrate that 
such a shift can change the evaluation of certain actions whose immediately realisable 
good was negligible . By recognising our own long-term investment in a larger 
context, otherwise negligible goods - like the benefits of forgoing copyrights - are 
brought to the fore. But, while this shift does increase the va lue to me of incremental 
improvements to the world in general, this is not the only sense in which other-
directed good acts are a benefit to me. 
Indirect Value: Others' Assessment 
The second way in which other-directed goods carry additional value is in the 
positive assessment others accord to such acts. Note that we have not yet moved onto 
Heyd's hermeneutic point - that the general good of society is served by the 
promulgation of exemplary moral acts. Before we reach this claim, it is worth pausing 
for a moment on the more localised impact of others' positive assessment. Heyd 
noted, in a somewhat detached way, that other-directed good acts can engender "the 
strengthening of social bonds [and that] relations between the members of the group 
become more friendly , personal, and based on good will. Benevolence and gratitude 
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enhance mutual trust and confidence."'53 But this is a slight under-description of what 
occurs here. It is not just the case that other-directed goods lead to an omni-directional 
bonhomie. Significantly, the relations that are strengthened - becoming more friendly, 
personal, trusting, and benevolent - include relations of others in the community 
toward the agent. As a result of my attending to Dilbert in his personal crisis, others 
around me assess my character positively, that is, they evaluate me as being disposed 
to respond to the suffering of others. Though there is room for fairly complex 
evaluations, not all of them positive - others could think me a sentimental idiot, a 
meddlesome busybody, or too naive to recognise Dilbert's hangover for what it really 
is - if we assume for a moment a relatively accurate and positive appraisal of my 
action, then others come away with reason to think that I would treat them in a similar 
manner. Again, as with any act of communication, there is the potential for 
misinterpretation. Others may see me as disposed to help people near my own age, or 
people related to the boss, or people with Dilbert's "reputation" around the office, but 
not to help all people, or people like them. Of course, accurate character assessment 
requires more than a single datum and lasting positive evaluation requires that I 
demonstrate a lasting disposition to act appropriately. This is, of course, 
conspicuously problematic for a Particularist. Since not everyone is capable of 
understanding the precise details of the situation that I am faced with, I may well be 
blamed for acting (or forgoing action) by others who characterise the situation 
differently. But this is not a problem of the theory - it is a constant of human life that 
we are subject to such assessments, and theoretical stances do nothing to mitigate or 
aggravate this. The point of this descriptive focus is merely to note that, when our 
circumstances are clearly ev ident and others note it with sufficient attention, other-
directed goods generate the additional good, for us, of positive character evaluation. 
The resurgence of interest in virtues of character evinced by developments in 
Virtue Ethics and Virtue Theory suggests that there is something to be said for a focus 
on dispositions of character. A particularly suggestive corroboration of the utility and 
pervasiveness of character-evaluation is the growth of reputation-economies in online 
communities. Stripped of the conventional binding-forces of coincident geographic or 
economic identity, such communities are constituted solely by interaction with others, 
and place a high premium on members' history of interaction. The term "whuffie,,,'l4 
153 Supererogation, p 179. 
154 http://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/whuffie 
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first coined in Cory Doctorow's novel Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom,'" is 
used to model the value of reputation as analogous to currency and track it 
economically. Here "a person's whuffie is a general measurement of his or her overall 
reputation and whuffie is lost and gained according to a person's favourable or 
unfavourable actions [for others]."'" Though the economic analogy has its limits, it 
seems that the idea ofwhuffie can be used productively, as "many community-
oriented websites are experimenting with whuffie-like concepts of reputation 
management (Slashdot's karma system, for example, or eBay 's feedback ratings) ."'S7 
This trend suggests that a significant and pervasive part of our interaction with others 
relies on character evaluation. As such, it seems reasonable to factor the chance of 
accruing positive whuffie as an additional good attached to other-directed goods. 
A possible objection here is that, since the practical functioning of a whuffie 
system relies on a community capable of continuous comparative evaluation of an 
individual's character, it cannot provide a motive to do good for strangers, or when 
others are unlikely to notice the action . At this stage in the argument I am prepared to 
concede as much - my argument for the benefits of other-directed good actions does 
not rest of whuffie alone, and all I need suggest at this stage is that there are some 
cases in which the potential of accruing positive whuffie serves as an additional value. 
Indirect Value: Hermeneutic Value 
Now we come to the hermeneutic value of other-directed goods. Here Heyd noted 
"we may expose [ others] by various means to some standards of moral excellence 
which would make them try to emulate those who live up to such standards."'" While 
I agree with this point, there is more to be said. Heyd casts the value of "Ideals" '" as 
a useful, perhaps even necessary way to augment "the morality of duty, obligation, 
and justice, which is essentially social and formulated in universal principles." 160 
While models of moral excellence such as heroism do indeed serve as ideals, it seems 
to me that the hermeneutic value of other-directed goods is more mundane, and thus 
more pervasive, than this description suggests. This positive value derives not just 
ISS Full text available on a Creative Commons license at http://vvww.craphound.com/down In the novel, 
Doctorow posits reputation as the only viable currency in a post-scarcity economy. 
1~6 hUp:flen.wikipedia.org/wikilwhuffie 
'" http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/whuffie 
153 Supererogation, p 182. 
159 Supererogation p 182 . Heyd is careful to note that "ideal" -oriented acts arc valuable in themselves, 
and not merely to encourage an overshoot that will realise morc good acts. I do not take this to be the 
major issue at stake. 
16f1 Supererogatjon p 182. Naturally 1 find this kind of strong Generalism untenable. 
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from showy exemplary acts like heroism and martyrdom, but from everyday instances 
of generosity, consideration, and forgiveness. In encountering instances of such acts, 
not only do we come to think better of the agent - in many cases - we also re-assess 
the world as the sort of place in which other-directed goodness is a viable tactic. 
Note that with the use of the word "tactic" I have slipped into Game Theory-speak. 
I do so intentionally, to highlight the point that when we find other-directed goods to 
be extraordinary, we are not necessari ly doing so in relation to some innate 
understanding of transcended duties, as Supererogationists seem to assume. Rather, 
we can recognise such acts as willingly placing ourselves at risk of exploitation by 
unscrupulous agents (or "Straightforward Maximisers"' '' ). When we encounter such 
behaviour (assuming that we have sufficient reason to think the agent is not merely 
hopelessly naIve), we appraise not just the agent, but the sort of environment that 
allows an agent who behaves this way to survive. The message construed by 
witnessing enough instances of such action is not merely "I am altruistic," but "the 
world is such that altruism can be a viable approach." Again, though Heyd 
acknowledges this hermeneutic value, his account seems to under-describe its 
pervasiveness. 
Thus far I have argued that some other-directed goods have an interesting capacity 
to increase in value when viewed in a broader context than the immediate, even to the 
extent of reversing a short-term disvalue . In addition, the specific context of other 
evaluators attaches the potential for additional value to such acts - the value of 
accruing positive whuffie, and the hermeneutic value of encouraging others to behave 
altruistically. While theorists generally acknowledge these features, I have argued that 
the extent of their impact is significantly greater than is generally credited. As such, 
there appears to be some significant pressure to perform other-directed good acts, 
where they are good in one or more of the senses noted above. Despite focusing 
largely on the benefit to the agent of performing such acts, nothing I have said so far 
is uniquely Eudaimonist. The foregoing picture seems to me to be coherent on most 
conceptions of the Good. 
But it is also something less than utterly compelling. The Immoralist may concede 
all of the above, without being personally moved by the positive pressure of axiology. 
While a world in which people orient toward the context of the greater good by virtue 
of their stake in it is a better world to live in, that is a reason to inhabit a world where 
161 See Danielson's Artificial MoraljO', ppll-12. He borrows the term from David Gauthier. 
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people do so, not to contribute toward it oneself. While pos itive whuffie is a good 
worth having, that is not a reason to seek it exclusively through legitimate means. Any 
system based on approximations can be exploited. To meet this canny parasite, the 
eudairnonist response must argue that other-directed goods are good/or the agent in a 
far more essential sense. 
Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu 
Seeking to re-examine our relation to others, I tum to the conceptions developed in 
recent African Philosophy that inform Gyekye ' s Anti-Supererogationism. It is a fairly 
recurrent theme in African Philosophy that our interdependence on one another is a 
vital part of human life, a fact seen as consistently overlooked by the atomistic models 
developed by Western Philosophy. Here Kwasi Wiredu states, in his characteristically 
proverbial style, that Akan culture "think[s] of life (obra) as one continuous drama of 
mutual aid (nnoboa). Obra ye nnoboa: 'Life is mutual aid,' according to the Akan 
saying," I62 while Desmond Tutu holds that "we are created to live in a delicate 
network of interdependence." I63 Naturally enough, models that foreground 
interdependence to this extent cast failure to respond to the needs of others as negative 
action, rather than a permissible imperfection - Wiredu finds that "the ultimate moral 
inadequacy consists in that lack of feeling which is the root of all selfishness,"I64 and 
Tutu says, 
Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is 
for us the summum bonum - the greatest good. Anything that subverts, 
that undermines this sought-after good, is to be avoided like the 
plague. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even success through 
aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this good l6S 
This is not simply the parochial claim that, in the small communities in which 
these accounts are rooted, people pay careful attention to one another's character and 
watch carefully for free -riders. Nor is it simply the anthropological claim that many 
traditional African societies tend to foreground community interaction. Rather, it is an 
expression of a deeper ontological claim about our nature as social beings . Here 
162 The Moral Foundations of an African ClIllure, in The African Philosophy Reader, P.H Coetzee 
and A.P.J. Roux (eds), Routledge, 1998, p313. 
163 NQ Future Withoyt Foreiveness, Doubleday, 1999, p265. 
164 The Moral Foundations of an African Culture, p310. 
16S No Future Without Forgiyeness, p31. 
Gyekye' s Anti-Supererogationism pivots on his conception of our inescapable 
interdependence on others: 
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The relational character of the individual by virtue of her natural 
sociality immediately makes her naturally oriented towards other 
persons with whom she must live. Living in relation to others directly 
involves an individual in social and moral roles, obligations, 
commitments, and responsibilities, which the individual must fulfil. 
The natural relationality of the person thus immediately plunges her 
into a moral universe. Social life itself, thus, prescribes or mandates a 
morality that should orient the individual toward an appreciation of 
shared, and not only individual ends. l66 
Suggestive as this conception is, it leaves itself open to two problematic 
interpretations we should dispense with before moving on. In the first place, we must 
avoid the temptation to see such an argument as arguing for debt or duty - this is not 
Contractarianism by stealth. Though the language of obligations entailed by living in 
relation to others is redolent of an implicit social contract embedded in legalistic 
ethical models, neither Gyekye's axiology nor the axiological account I have 
developed thus far are properly expressed in Deontic or Contractarian terms. As we 
have seen, the answer to "Why ought I help her?" is not "Because you owe it to her" 
but, "Because you are invested in the good such an action would bring about." So we 
must overlook Gyekye's deontic language and read him as pointing toward an 
inescapably shared investment in others. 
The second problematic interpretation is that the statement "Social life itself ... 
prescribes or mandates a morality ... ,,167 seems to conjure an Ought from an Is. As I 
argued in Chapter 3, claims that seem, prima facie to be asserting Is->Ought can be 
understood more favourably as arguing that, given the true factual claim that we value 
X, we are rationally bound to value and pursue what is entailed by X. Is such a 
reading possible in this case? I think it is, but the formulation that lends itself to such 
a rational-axiological explication is not Gyekye ' s. Instead I turn to the South African 
concept of ubuntu, which seems to be contiguous with Gyekye's account of 
community-orientation (here I agree with Richard Bell 16'). Tutu has done much to 
166 Tradition and Modernity, p67. 
167 Tradition and Modernity, p67. 
16R Bell's account of the continuity between these views is in his Understandinc African Philosophy. 
pp85-90. 
promulgate the use of the term and his definition of what it is to "have" ubuntu 
(casting it as a virtue of character) is canonical. On this account, when you have 
ubuntu 
68 
Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring 
and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, "My 
humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours." We belong 
in a bundle of life. We say, a person is a person through other 
persons. 10' 
The claim that "a person is a person through other persons" is a translation of the 
Nguni phrase umuntu ngumuntu ngabantul7". Most translations into English amount to 
roughly the same claim, frequently glossed blandly as "we are who we are through 
others," but Mogobe Ramose makes a strong claim, in his exhaustive syntactic 
analysis of the phrase,17l for foregrounding the notion of being (or "be-ing,,172 as a 
process best expressed in gerundive language) . As such, a closer approximation may 
be "Being a person is being a person being people.,,173 Corroborating Tutu's claim that 
"Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language," 174 an additional nuance 
is that the prefix "nga-" is an imperative - so that the fuller translation of umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu is "Being a person must be being a person being people." To 
avoid any ambiguity, one final amendment is that I do not think this imperative 
should be read as a normative imperative, but rather as a descriptive one. The English 
translation thus comes to look more like "Being a person cannot but be being a person 
being people." Little wonder that the term "ubuntu" is generally used as a shorthand 
substitute for this more extended form. 
Two things are noteworthy about ubuntu as discussed so far. The first is that, in the 
extended form - u!nuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - it seems like a promising response to 
the Immoralist - that we ought to pursue the good of others because the project of our 
own being is (somehow) tied to the project of theirs. Such a model would seem 
169 No Future WitbQut FOTlliyeness, p31. 
170 Pronunciation differs slightly between the Nguni languages, isiXhosa and isiZulu. The precise 
equivalent in Sesotho languages is "motho ke motho ka batho." 
171 The Philosophy OJUb,lnlu and Ubunlll as Philosophy, in PhilosQphy from Africa, P.H Coetzee and 
A.P.J. Raux (eds), Oxford University Press, 2002, pp230-239. 
'" The Philosophy of Ubunlu and Ubuntu as Philosophy, p231. Ramose argues that the phrase is one of 
many that are not properly translatable into a natural or logical language constructed on the subject-
verb-object distinction. and that a "rheomodic" logical language incorporating gcnmds is necessary. 
m Any clumsiness in this translation is entirely my fault. It is my own inexpert literal translation of the 
isiXhosa. r find it useful, however, in making the emphasis on the project of "being" explicit. 
11~ No Fyture Wjthoyt Fore-jyeness , p31. 
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sufficient to escape the difficulty with the Is-Ought implication; it is not a claim that 
our nature entails a set of norms, but rather the factual statement that our being entails 
or is constituted by some relation with others. In terms of rational axiological 
responses, this entails the conditional that, ifwe value our being, then it is rational to 
value and pursue the interaction with others intrinsic to it. Like eudaimonia, it just 
happens to be the case that we cannot but value our being. Of course, this is just a 
statement of how umuntll ngumllntu ngabantu could be valid iftrue. Proving that it is 
the proper description of the human condition requires a more substantive argument. 
Before moving on to a more substantive understanding of lIbllntll, the second point 
to note is that discussions of the concept are necessarily problematic. As noted, the 
difficulty in translating lImllntll ngumllntll ngabantu has led to the use of ubuntu 
(which, literally translated, is simply the abstract form of something like 
"personhood") as shorthand. Unfortunately, this tendency toward shorthand has bred 
significant ambiguity and, in colloquial use, the term functions as a general signifier 
for shifting bundles of vaguely defined community-oriented sentiments. In this 
context, its status as buzzword has led to any number of wildly divergent viewpoints 
being folded into the concept and presented as natural to it. As a result of its frequent 
deployment in rhetorical and Human Resources contexts, "for many, lIbuntu is just a 
noble sentiment without any real meaning, nothing but a sales gimmick."17S In 
addition to these connotations in the broad public context, a number of more 
philosophical difficulties crop up when the term is discussed. Martha Minnow notes 
that "the notion of ubuntu may be as much a current invention as a recovery of past 
practices,,, '76 and Richard Bell'" observes that ubuntu can be cast as a form of the 
fallacy of unanimism, which Paulin Hountondji defined as "the illusion that all men 
and women in [African] societies speak with one voice or share the same opinion 
about all fundamental issues.,, '78 The issue is further confused when ubuntu is 
associated with the diverse projects yoked to it, including Augustine Shutle' s 
modified Thomist metaphysic of a "universal field of force" "9 and Mogobe Ramose's 
'" Dirk 1. Louw, quoted in Charlene Rolls' Uhlln/lI: For Sale or for SOIlI?, Fair Lady, October 2005, 
p52. 
176 Between Vengeance and Forgiyeness' Facing Hjsto!:Y after Genocide and Mass violence, Beacon 
Press, 1998, p174. 
177 Understandj nG" African Philosophy. p89. 
171 In his African Philosophy' Myth and Reality, Indiana University Press, 1996, pxviii. 
'" Philosopby for Africa, UCT Press, 1993, p52. 
claim that ubuntu is the necessary and sufficient condition for all African 
Philosophy.''' 
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In light of such difficulties, why do I invoke the concept at all? In the first place, 
discussing a term whose meaning is contentious or unclear is hardly new territory for 
philosophy and public opinion has little enough impact of the validity and 
applicabi lity of terms such as akrasia, angst, or schadenfreude, which remain 
contentful descriptions of the human experience regardless of their modishness at any 
given time. More to the point, I am not concerned with the myriad ambiguous 
connotations of the signifier "ubuntu," I am specifically concerned to examine the 
interesting ontological statement umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. 
As to why it seems a good idea to do even this much, it seems to me that there is a 
baby bobbing in this bathwater. A colloquial use of the term is interesting here. When 
an individual, given the opportunity to help others, evinces self-interested behaviour, 
she is said to "have no ubuntu," while Tutu describes the contrary praise as " ' Yu, u 
nobuntu '; 'Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.' ,,1'1 Casting other-directedness as a factual 
understanding that can either be properly grasped or missed, this usage demonstrates 
confidence that other-regarding virtue is simply the same as rational behaviour. This 
is the confidence so markedly missing from neo-Hobbesian Western models. 
Moreover, from a eudaimonist perspective, umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu looks to be 
precisely the claim necessary to express our inescapable investment in the good of 
others, by pegging it to our being. 
But what sort of being are we talking about? What is it about "being a person" that 
is dependent on our interaction with others? The claim surely amounts to something 
more than that we are physically dependent on one another, since this by itself is not a 
reason to be concerned with the good of others beyond the minimal requirements of 
reciprocity accepted by even the most libertarian of Contractualists. As Eagleton ·notes 
It is a material fact that we are dependent on others for our physical 
survival , given the helpless state in which we are born. Yet this 
dependency cannot really be divorced from such moral capacities as 
care, selflessness, vigilance and protectiveness, since what we are 
dependent on is exactly such capacities in those who look after us . .. . 
LSD I do not feel that I am exaggerating his emphasis. I am thinking here of the claim "Ubuntu is the root 
of all African philosophy" which opens The Philosophy oj Ubunlu and Ubunlu as Philosophy. This 
article is also the third chapter of his book, African Philosophy Tbroui:h UbllntU , 2001. 
til No Future Without Forgiyeness, p31 , 
We shall literally not become persons, as opposed to being human 
animals, unless those whom we bank on share something of their 
affective and communicative life with US."' 82 
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Of course, this is a reason to want others to be generous toward us, and to be so 
toward those we already happen to care about - but many of the most atomistic 
people in the world - of whom we would definitely say that they had no ubuntu -
would concede this much. What the Immoralist would demand to be shown is how we 
have reason to care about others in general, beyond our socially-contractual 
obligations and the feelings we have for those we already care about. 
And the answer, Eagleton seems to agree with African philosophers, must involve 
something essential to us that is at risk of being unrealised, "becom[ing] persons, as 
opposed to being human animals."'" Here Gyekye states that "When an individual's 
conduct consistently appears cruel, wicked, selfish, or ungenerous, the Akan would 
say of that individual that 'he is not a person' (onye onipa).,,'84 Wiredu (also an Akan 
philosopher articulating from within that tradition) corroborates, noting that such 
"habitual default in duties [sic] and responsibilities could lead to a diminution in one ' s 
status as person in the eyes of the community."'" Both authors are at pains to point 
out that this is not equ ivalent to the loss of status as a bearer of human rights. Gyekye 
dedicates a significant amount of time to refuting arguments by lfeanyi Menkiti 186 
which allow such exclusion. ''Nevertheless,'' Wiredu continues, "any Akan steeped in 
culture, or even just sensitive to surrounding norms, constantly watches and prays lest 
he/she be overtaken by the spectre of loss of personhood." 187 This discussion seems to 
suggest that the impetus for being a person is community approval, a consequence, I 
suspect, of addressing the issue of being "not a person" in the terms established by 
Menkiti and, earlier, John Mbiti l88 Their models, in which personhood was 
conditional upon the approval of the community, had been broadly accepted prior to 
Gyekye' s refutation,' 89 engendering far too strong a focus in the discourse on the 
' '2 After TheO!y, ppI68-169. 
II) After Theory, pp 168-169 
IU Tradition and Modernity, p49. 
IRS The Moral Foundations of an African Culture, p311. 
llli Persons and Community in African Traditional Thought, in African Philosophy' An Introduction, 
Richard A. Wright (ed), University Press of America, 1984. 
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UI In his African Relieious and Philosophy, Heineman, 1969. This is the source ofMbiti's much-
quoted, but almost certainly ill-advised attempt to cast African thought as a reworking of the cogito "I 
am because we afe: and since we are, therefore I am." 
,.9 In Tradition and Modernity and, in more detail, in the earlier Person and Community in African 
Thought. 
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punitive response of the community. But personhood is also cast as constituted by the 
community without being simply a matter of community approbation or approval. 
Here Tutu notes, in his description of ubuntu as a virtue (thus, as a goal worthy of 
pursuing for the agent's own sake) that "the completely self-sufficient person would 
be sub-human."I90 He also notes that ubuntu involves the realisation that "what 
dehumanizes you inexorably dehumanizes me.,,191 
What is the sense in which we are less a person? What aspect of our personhood 
depends on others, and how? In the next sections I will examine two possible 
answers: being a person minimally and the value of such actions. 
Being a Person (Minimally) 
On a minimal model of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, other-directed goods, or an 
orientation toward realising them, are essential to some basic aspect of our 
functioning. The most basic such aspect that seems to depend on others is our 
awareness of ourselves as individuals, as Eagleton notes. 
Individuation is one of the activities proper to our species being. It is a 
practice, not a given condition. It is something that we do, as we come 
to negotiate a unique identity for ourselves in the very media that we 
share in common. Being an individual human being is not like being an 
individual peach. It is a project we have to accomplish. It is an 
autonomy we forge for ourselves on the basis of our shared existence, 
and thus a function of our dependency rather than an alternative to it. 
Our species life is such that it enables us to establish a unique 
relationship to the species known as personal identity.l 92 
Pedro Tabensky offers an account of our individuation depending on others, 
arguing that our rational functioning depends, at a very basic level , on a sensitivity to 
the situation of others. Extending Donald Davidson's account of rationality as 
dependent on the existence of at least one other agent, Tabensky argues that, in order 
to be "most properly instantiated," rationality requires that "the subjects in dialogue 
be substantially different from one another." 193 I am not concerned here to dissect his 
argument on this point. For the purposes of this discussion, I accept his claim, that 
]90 No Future without Forgiyeness, p265. 
19 1 No Future without Forgiveness, p31. 
192 After Theory, p 163. 
193 Happiness' PersonhoQd Community Pyrpose, Ashgate, 2003. 
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having an awareness of perspective (which is presupposed by rationality) requires 
recognition of mUltiple possible perspectives '94. What is interesting, however, is 
Tabensky's understanding of "properly instantiated" or "full" rationality. He argues, 
quite persuasively, that the world of Orwell 's ~, in which the monolithic 
perspective of Big Brother intrudes on the perspective of each agent to the point of 
eclipsing it, would be a world in which 
the triangle constituted by our grasp of the 
subjective/intersubjective/objective modes of knowing is only 
minimally instantiated. [While it is true that] the people inhabiting this 
hell are minimally rational insofar as they are minimally able to grasp 
the concepts determined by Davidson, it seems equally clear that much 
more is required for us to count as fully rational."'" 
Likening real-world Totalitarian societies to Orwell's (where Orwell ' s world and 
the condition of Winston Smith represent an extreme), Tabensky argues that 
rationality can be realised to an ever greater extent along a continuum and that our 
eudaimonia drives us toward the fullest realisation of rationality. Since this realisation 
requires maximal exposure to very different perspectives on the world, "pluralism is a 
condition for eudaimonia." 196 Since a truly pluralist society must be sensitive to the 
perspectives of many others, this seems to give me a reason both to pursue exposure 
to others (thus entailing sensitivity to their conditions) and to engage in making the 
world the sort of place that allows the promulgation of difference . 
There is a problem with this model, however. We may imagine an Athenian citizen 
who, convinced by this argument, seeks maximal exposure to other perspectives. To 
this end, he cultivates the company of male citizens from many different backgrounds 
- peasants from beyond the polis, Spartans and Carthaginians - but not women or 
other natural slaves - that thought would not occur to him. Tabensky has a response; 
such a view would be inconsistent. Ari stotle himself was inconsistent in holding this 
view, as "there are good reasons for believing that Aristotle's account of slavery is 
inconsistent with his overall account - his teleological account - of what it is to be a 
person.,,197 
194 His argument to this effect (Happiness, ppI2S-140) is significantly persuasive, though Davidson's 
claims are not uncontroversiaL 
195 Happiness, p140. 
196 Happiness, p141. 
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I agree entirely, but it is not a sufficient response to note that such a life is 
inconsistent with eudaimonia. What is troubling here is that it is hard to understand 
how the agent can detect this sort of inconsistency. Let's update the example: now we 
have the resident of a cosmopolitan first-world city with a thriving cultural precinct 
(call her Barbie). She is exposed to restaurants, travelling exhibitions, and quaintly 
packaged craft knick-knacks from many cultures and benefits from all manner of 
trendy Far-Eastern meditation and exercise techniques. If asked, she would describe 
herself as thoroughly cosmopolitan and open to many cultures and we may assume 
that this is true; she is honestly open to having her presuppositions challenged and 
boundaries expanded by people from cultures very different from her own. All of this 
is possible while she fails to see any need to be generous or caring to those around her 
of a different economic class, or to sympathise with those whose political views differ 
markedly from her own. By her own lights, she is well exposed to various other 
influences, thus meeting Tabensky's requirements; she is exposing herself to the 
potential for radical redefinition of her perspective and is thus robustly rational. This 
rationality fails, however, to issue in a recognition of the situation of certain others, 
amounting to a "blind-spot" in the repertoire of human situations that she is capable of 
understanding. 
Clearly Tabensky would want to say that this is just another case of the Athenian 
citizen, she is inconsistent to limit the extent of her consideration, since flourishing 
requires that we admit an effectively infinite number of alternative perspectives. What 
is relevant here is not that she is inconsistent, but that it is difficult for her to detect 
her inconsistency. Barbie's inconsistency is the same mistake made by the Athenian 
citizen, or a philanthropic housewife under apartheid. It is an easy one to make, 
because maximal rationality, although a rational goal to pursue, is not coherently 
pursuable in quite the same way as eudaimonia simpliciter. I can understand what the 
best life would be, in outline, since I have an experience of what it feels like for a part 
of my life to be meaningful - that is, more meaningful than some other part of it - and 
can clearly conceive of a life in which what is most meaningful is best arrayed, but 
rationality is not quite the same thing. Although I have some memory of being less 
rational as a child than I am now, it is hard for me to conceive of what it would mean 
to work toward "fuller" rationality. It certainly sounds desirable and worthy of 
pursuit, in much the same way as being able to see a four-dimensional shape does, but 
being "fully rational" is not a specific skill, like learning to speed-read or improve my 
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memory. Though it may well be a real and contentful state, it is not the sort of state 
we are capable of judging our progress toward from the perspective of our own lives. 
It seems that Barbie, or the Athenian, or the apartheid socialite, can always feel 
satisfied, from their own perspective, that they are already fully rational, since from 
any rational standpoint (that is, any standpoint less existentially oppressive than a Big 
Brother totalitarianism) as fully rational as I am now is roughly as fully rational as I 
can imagine being. And it is hard to see why the Immoralist (even accepting the 
pragmatic reasons for eudaimonism generated thus far), would feel a need for any 
more profound accommodation of the good of others than Barbie has. Barbie can live 
a satisfied life and if it is a life less satisfying than some other possible life, it isn ' t 
recognisable as such from her perspective (unlike a more conventional account of 
eudaimonia, like a life in which she overcomes her akrasia). For the Immoralist to be 
convinced by Tabensky ' s argument, the value of being fully rational needs to be the 
sort of value that can be grasped in sufficient detail to compare it to those other goods 
surrendered to pursue it. 
Tabensky may reply that we should pursue a consistent openness to the 
perspectives and situations of all others and to rigorously checking that our 
implementation of this approach is consistent. To the extent that such an openness is 
manifested in our everyday actions, we still need some way to measure the value or 
disvalue of eschewing other pleasures . If we commit to an absolute openness to others 
in practical terms, we seem to embody Wolfs caricature of the Saint, but if we simply 
rest on what seems reasonable, we could have no greater success than Barbie. 
It seems, therefore, that even though Tabensky's model may provide a plausible 
sense in which umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, such an approach is not enough to 
provide much direction when we seek to apply the principle practically. As such, an 
Immoralist (or any other agent) convinced by the argument may have reason to want 
to live in a non-totalitarian society, without feeling sufficient pressure to pursue 
furthering pluralism when dealing with others generally. Ifwe are to understand the 
sense in which we are invested in the good of others, we must seek elsewhere. 
Val ue and Ubuntu 
If what we must be simply to exist as rational beings is not quite enough to bring 
us to care for others, there is another sense in which something can be essential to our 
being. It may be that there are things so valuable that no life could be sufficient 
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without them. The experience of caring for others, of participating with them in 
mitigating their disvalues, is itself valuable. The suggestion here is that this value may 
contribute to some more complex value that can be seen as essential to the complete 
human life. Although the value attached to such actions may seem trivialprimajacie, 
it seems to me that there are good reasons to see the value we experience in practicing 
other-directed goodness as the crucial reason to pursue it. 
In much the same way that Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine" thought 
experiment suggested that a simulated life of pleasure would lack some essential 
value, I want to suggest that a world in which we gained the benefits of other-directed 
social good without valuing them for their own sake would be badly lacking. Two 
fictional examples seem to corroborate this suspicion. In the first, David Brin's short 
story The Giving Plague, 198 a virologist di scovers a virus, spread through the blood 
donation service, which generates an addiction to giving blood. In something like the 
inverse of Heyd and Titmuss' worry, those infected with "Acquired Lavish Altruism 
Syndrome" become increasingly philanthropic in other spheres of their lives, and the 
infection 's spread slowly transforms the world into a more altruistic place. The 
narrator, a bitter, selfish would-be murderer, is driven to care for others as a 
demonstration of his autonomy, and ends the story ranting at the disease that: 
it doesn ' t matter to me that I'm behaving no different than anyone else 
today. They are all marionettes. They are your puppets, ALAS. But I 
am a man, do you hear me? I make my own decisions. Fever wracks 
my body now, as I drag myselffrom bed to bed, holding their hands, 
doing what I can to ease their suffering, to save a few. You'll not have 
me, ALAS. This is what I choose to dO.19' 
Here we can sympathise with the narrator - even a near-utopian world of so lidari ty 
and other-concern would seem less valuable if it were a mere side-effect, rather than 
an actual recognition of the act's value. Of course, spite is not a particularly valuable 
motive for action either and the protagonist could simply be read as wanting 
autonomy. Lest dramatic irony obscure the point, the second example, from John 
Brunner's novel, Stand on Zanzibar: in an overcrowded dystopia, consultants for a 
giant corporation have discovered a pheremonal quirk that nullifies human 
'" Otherness, Orbit Books, 1994, pp3-27. Full text available at 
httpJIwww.davidbrin.comigivingplague1.html 
199 The Giving Plague, Otherness, Orbit, 1994, p27. 
aggression, engendering peaceful co-existence. A plan to synthesise it builds (once 
again) to a climactic tirade, 
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'What does it matter if we have to take brotherly love out of an aeroso l 
can? It's contagious stuff no matter where you get it from.' 
Norman nodded. His mouth was very dry. 
'But it's not right!' Chad whispered. ' It's not something to be made in 
a factory, packaged and wrapped and sold! It's not something meant to 
be - to be dropped in bombs from UN aircraft! That's what they'll do 
with it, you know. And it isn 't right - it isn't a product, a medicine, a 
drug. It's thought and feeling your own heart's blood. It isn't right! '''''' 
These examples suggest that the value of the end-states is not enough, however 
large, to account for all of the value we seek in other-directed goods. We find other-
directed good actions to be good themselves. Or, to cast the observation in terms of 
virtues rather than acts, we value the sorts of character such practices allow us to 
develop and the sorts of relations they allow. The Immoralist may well be sceptical. 
Sure, helping others feels good, as does thinking oneself to be the kind of person who 
is good to others, but can this be a strong enough reason to counteract our own 
immediate self-interest? 
Here Tabensky offers a second argument, which seems to provide a reason to 
believe exactly this. Echoing the structure of umunlu ngumunlu ngabanlu, Tabensky 
notes that " there is a sense in which my Ie/os is implicated in the Ie/os of each 
member of our community," where our community is characterised by "outwardly 
expanding webs of 10ve."201 That is, our teleological connection to the good of others 
expands "outwards" from, or is entailed by, our relationships to loved ones. This is 
not simply the claim that the prudential protection of those we care about requires that 
we invest in the common good, as Tabensky points out: 
I do not want to suggest that one ought to care for the wider 
community for instrumental reasons - that is, simply because the wider 
community provides for the possibility of the existence on my 
immediate circle of friends (although my circle offriends is certainly 
just that circle only insofar as that circle is embedded in a wider 
network of relationships). Rather, I believe our concerns for the 
200 Stand OIl Zanzibar, Victor Gollancz, 1968 (Repr. 1999), p646. 
2U I Happiness. p 175. 
community at large ought to be based on a genuine appreciation of 
how our lives depend on the overall pattern of relationships which 
constitutes society at large.20' 
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How is it, then, that enough can hang on our appreciation of others to provide a 
powerful obligation toward the general good? Certainly it seems that appreciating 
others is a virtue and thus contributory to the agent's character (and thus, toward 
eudaimonia), but can appreciating the situation of others be so valuable, to the agent, 
as to outweigh self-interested actions? Here I must note that Tabensky' s own 
argument in this direction rests on the metaphor "webs of love.,,'03 He argues that the 
set of those we care about is so imbricated with other such sets that 
concern for one's own eudaimonia and the eudaimonia of those we 
love ideally implicates our concern for the eudaimonia of our 
community at large'04 
While I agree and find the metaphor of ever-expanding webs of love evocative, I 
am not convinced that this is sufficient to sway the Immoralist (or some other 
sceptic). Granting that our circle of loved ones is embedded within a larger 
community and that this interpenetrates with other such circles, this by itself is no 
more than I have already argued, which is sufficient to convince the Immoralist to 
want to live in a world where people are good to one another, but not to take up such 
behaviour herself. 
Having said as much, I do think Tabensky furnishes a sufficient solution, arguing 
for "a relationship of mutual constitution"'" between the greater social good and the 
good of those we care about. Resting the argument for our commitment to the good on 
the force of the "webs oflove" metaphor, Tabensky devotes most of his effort to 
arguing that being virtuous citizens requires that we must be virtuous friends. I will 
argue for the same co-constitutive relation from the opposite direction, using 
Tabensky 's arguments to shore up the converse, that properly caring for our loved 
ones entails caring for others generally. 
Tabensky ' s account is interesting in that it is amenable to reformulation along the 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu structure, as follows: we cannot but want ph ilia (love), 
and the capacity to love those close to liS depends on our capacity to care for others in 
202 Happiness, p164. Italics in original. 
ZIl) Happiness, p 175. 
, .. Happiness, p 175. 
205 Happiness, p 175 . 
general. This formulation yields the conditional "If I value lov ing relationships with 
certain others, then I ought to care about others generally." As neat a conditional as 
this is, how do we get there? 
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Tabensky spends some time arguing that loved ones (Philoi) are necessary to the 
good life'06 and I agree with him entirely. It seems, though, that most people would 
not need much convincing that love is a sufficiently important part of our lives to 
justify sacrificing our immediate self-interest and reshaping our character, in fact, 
such actions are a practically the litmus test for love, but the sort of love described 
here is significant. Philia designates more than mere affection (even pass ionate, 
overwhelming affection). Although applicable in a secondary sense to instrumental 
relationships, the primary use of ph ilia describes what Tabensky, succinctly glossing 
Aristotle, calls "virtue fri endships."'" These are fri endships in which we are 
concerned with promoting the other's "noble character.,,'08 Again, while much can be 
said in eudaimonist terms, I suspect that it is a perfectly familiar idea that loving 
someone involves a desire to bring about the best for them, which they reciprocate. 
Or, as Eagleton puts it, 
Love means creating for another the kind of space in which he can 
flouri sh, at the same time as he does this for you. It is to find one' s 
happiness in being the reason for the happiness of another. It is not that 
you find your fulfilment in the same goal, like hitting the open road 
clasped together on a motor-cycle, but . .. that you each find your 
fulfilment in the other's."9 
Beyond being the sort of relationship that seems uncontroversially to be 
overwhelmingly valuable, ph ilia carries with it an inherent drive toward 
maximisation. We want not merely to meet the conditions for the other's happiness, 
but to do as much as we can for them. As with our own flouri shing (of which philia 
seems a necessary part), there is a drive toward the best state, rather than a merely 
satisfactory one. 
Here the Immoralist may fee l a need to interject. It may very well be the case that 
some people are essential to my eudaimonia, but that is a reason to consider their 
interests above my own, not the interests of everyone. In small communities like the 
206 Happiness, pp 161-171. 
207 Happiness, pp159-160. 
2118 Happiness, p159. 
209 After The9!Y. p169. 
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polis or traditional African communities, it may well have been the case that my 
immediate "web of love" intersected with a network of other such webs in a way that 
demanded my concern for just about everyone, but this is patently not true of the 
modern world. I cannot be expected to love everyone. 
Tabensky can concede this point, noting that there are "psychological limits,,21· to 
the number of people we can love: 
So when I say that one must be concerned for one's community, I am 
not making the radically unreasonable claim that one must love every 
member of one ' s community (if someone claimed that they love 
everyone then they would either be lying, or they wou ld simply have 
no idea of what they were talking about). Rather, I merely think ... that 
one must care for one's community at large. 21 1 
Here care " involves ethical directedness toward others, but [not] necessarily 
intimacy of the sort we have in our primary relationships (although, of course, our 
primary relationships are to a greater or lesser degree relationships of care).,,212 It is 
worth noting that this ethical directedness cannot properly be called "care" if it does 
not issue in the urge to respond to the situations of others, that is, caring implies that 
we pursue the good of those we are moved to care for, where possible, but what is it 
about loving certain specific others that depends on our moral directedness toward 
others generally? 
Tabensky argues, in the best traditions of the Virtue Ethical focus on pedagogy, 
that much of the understanding we need to achieve eudaimonia can only be obtained 
through exposure to virtue friendships, since: 
In sharing with intimates we also ideally learn about human joy and 
suffering, and we learn to understand how circumstances (internal and 
external) impinge upon the quality of our lives. Moreover, in sharing 
with virtue friends, one most perfectly learns about virtue, and hence 
one is in the best possible position to act towards others as demanded 
by our ever-changing circumstances.2t3 
211l Happiness, pI 77. 
211 Happiness, p 177. Italics in original. It is significant that "community at large" means the global 
community here. 
2 12 Happiness, p209. 
213 Happiness, p165 . 
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While this is certainly true and a powerful reason to pursue virtue friendships , such 
a traditionally pedagogical approach misses two interlinked aspects of our philia 
relations: that they require a base level of virtue to function and that they can go quite 
badly wrong. This point rests on the fairly developed understanding of human joy and 
suffering and of character, needed in order to identifY those phronemoi capable of 
guiding us in virtue friendships. Here Aristotle notes that: 
The friendship of bad people .. . turns out to be an evil. For, because of 
their lack of stability, they share in bad pursuits, and turn evil through 
becoming like one another. 21' 
We cannot take for granted that we will necessarily be able to distinguish good 
influences from bad, and certainly not without an already reasonably developed 
understanding of the good and of human character. Given the myriad ways our lives 
could go wrong, it seems reasonable to assume at least as many ways the company we 
keep could turn out to be vicious, encouraging bad habits, bringing out the worst in 
us, or simply lowering the standards by which we judge the proper treatment of others 
(to say nothing of our vulnerability to "straightforward maximisers," confidence-
tricksters and abusive partners). This is even more problematic for those who have not 
had the opportunity to develop deep friendships, as Tabensky notes: 
An individual who spent his or her life wandering from short-term 
friendship to short-term friendship would only develop a 
correspondingly superficial understanding of how people are. For this 
reason, he or she would not have any significant point of comparison 
between the ongoing journey of his or her character and the character 
of others.215 
This is reminiscent of Barbie's position earlier, so let's bring her back: while it is 
true that Barbie wants meaningful relationships with philoi concerned with her 
flourishing, she lacks the context to recognise that this is not what her vapid friends 
and subtly abusive partner (call him Ken) offer. If sufficient insight to avoid Barbie's 
dilemma is available only to those who have already avoided it, then a great many 
people unlucky enough not to land in paradigmatically virtuous friendships are 
doomed. Luckily, intimate relations with ph ilia are not the only place that Barbie can 
look to build an understanding of the human good. "Ethical directedness toward 
'" Nicomachean Ethics Book IX:12:II72 a8-14. Translation by Roger Crisp, (Cambridge Texts in the 
History ofPhilosopby), Cambridge, 2000, p182. 
w Happiness, p168. 
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others" ' 16 (care) in a more general sense can provide Barbie with a picture of how it is 
with people, over a far broader range than her immediate philoi can furnish. Though 
she cannot understand the situations of these others in the same depth as those of her 
philoi, it seems that the breadth of examples may go some way toward compensating. 
Although caring for others in general is no substitute for the moral education provided 
by ph ilia, it is useful in framing basic parameters of what is valuable. These 
parameters, basic ethical responses, can provide a framework for distinguishing 
virtuous characters in others. Here the suggestion is that noticing that Ken never tips 
waitresses, is cold to the plight ofrefugees, ignores beggars and kicks sand into the 
faces of others on the beach could provide Barbie with insight into other aspects of his 
character, if she is attentive to the situation of these others, and capable of putting 
herself in their places. This attention to the broader picture of human values should 
allow her a context against which to analyse the actions of Ken and her vapid friends, 
and to better discern the good life and what is conducive to it. 
So we have reason to cultivate an interest in the situation of others, reason to care 
for their situation, because doing so orients us toward a picture of human values and 
thus allows us to properly distinguish between those relationships capable of further 
developing this awareness and issuing in our eudaimonia and those which detract 
from it. 
Here the Immoralist may wonder whether this is the whole trick. Though it seems 
useful to be sure about philia, this may not seem essential to our being people. But the 
value of care does not stop at allowing us to refine our philoi-selection criteria. Ph ilia 
and care for others continue to inform one another, our ever increasing understanding 
of the myriad complications of the human situation better allowing us to respond to 
those we love by recognising the minute particulars of their situations. We are not 
merely able to respond to a broader, subtler range of problems vexing our philoi. Our 
deeper understanding of their situations and the nearby possible situations, allows us 
to contribute more positively toward their flourishing. Since "one does not learn the 
virtues once and for all such that, once they are learned, there is nothing more left to 
do but to act virtuously,,,' 17 and love is a maximising urge, driving us toward the best 
for our philoi, our investment in carrying the lessons of care to the context of ph ilia 
never diminishes. 
216 Happiness, p209. 
217 Happiness, 169. 
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To demonstrate why this constitutes a clear reason to cultivate ethical directedness 
toward others, let us examine one more example. Imagine a man (call him Adolf), not 
particularly concerned with the plight of others generally, that is, he does not care 
very much about others, and spends very little time attending to the particulars of 
other people ' s lives. Though he has friends,218 these friends share his perspective on 
others in general and do little to drive him to consider the lives and plights of those 
beyond their immediate circle. He would not be convinced by Tabensky 's claim that 
his circle entails a connection to webs of love. In his experience, the world is a place 
with limited horizons within which caring is practicable. As a result, he has a 
" superficial understanding of how people are"'l ' and is frequently vexed by other 
people's behaviour and motivations. Given his limited conception of what goods are 
possible, he is not tortured by this myopia, though his life is limited or distorted, it is 
only so relative to alternatives he does not grasp and thus insufficient to motivate any 
higher reali sation of his eudaimonia. 
This is not the end of the story and not the only sense in which Adolfs life is 
tragic, because he is in love. An obtuse man, unaware of and thus unable to develop 
his eudaimon telos, is abstractly tragic, but the same man in love, but unable to 
properly express himself or read the nuanced needs of hi s inamorata, is aware of his 
own shortcomings. Adolfloves Winnie,'20 and she him. They each find their 
happiness in the happiness of the other, but Winnie shares Adolfs lack of care for the 
rest of the world, and the concomitant superficial understanding of the good. This 
changes the nature of their tragedy significantly. Adolf does not simply want Winnie 
to be happy, he wants her to be fulfilled, to be satisfied, and to have surfeit of all that 
is valuable. This maximising drive is basic to his love for her; it is a brute fact about 
his response to her, axiologically. He cannot but want this for her, but he also cannot 
provide it for her, or even begin to. Adolfs shallow understanding of the human good 
is no longer simply insufficient relative to some hypothetical model of eudaimonia, it 
is insufficient in a manner he finds frustratingly immediate: he tells stories which 
drive her idiot brother to tears, but is too disconnected to recognise it until after the 
211 I think it likely that such relationships would be instrumental or pleasure-based, rather than 
demonstrations of philia. To keep the example simple, I will not engage with whether such friends love 
him. 
ZI9 Happjness, p168. 
'" Named for the Verloes in Joseph Conrad's The Secret Agent, Penguin, 1907 (Rpt 2000). For the 
sake of this thought experiment, the two are genuinely in love with one another, in the sense outlined 
by Eagleton. Conrad gives no indication that anything like this is true of his Adolf and Winnie. 
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fact; he ignores her when she needs attention and dismisses her suggestions hurtfully; 
he propositions her sexually at awkward moments, including after clumsily 
announcing her brother's death . He is aware of having hurt her and tortured by it, but 
unable to avoid doing so. She reciprocates the relation. This is the sense in which, as 
Martha Nussbaum has stated "obtuseness is a moral failing."'" For both, their failure 
to grasp the human good in any detail is not a hypothetical imperfection, but a 
tangible incapacity to bring about the good they most value in the world. 
Note that we need not be quite as insensitive as Adolf and Winnie to find ourselves 
in their position. The drive to bring about the best for our phi/oi is intrinsic to loving 
them at all, which seems a necessary part of any good (human) life, but if orienting 
toward such a good is intrinsic to being human, success in realising it is not. Properly 
realising philia is an achievement and one that depends on our capacity to care for 
others. Like individuation, love is an activity Eagleton would call "proper to our 
species being." No good life could be complete without ph ilia and we orient toward it 
as naturally as we do toward our own good (precisely because it is partly constitutive 
of our good).'22 
To summarize, philia is indispensable to realising the good life and in that sense 
essential to being human, but, the full realisation of loving relationships with certain 
others entails that I care about others generally (where care entails directedness 
toward their situations, and an awareness of others as living the human situation). 
Unlike the case of Barbie's rationality, the inherent drive to maximise the good for 
my philoi provides a reasonfor me to pursue the best realisation of the good, rather 
than accept the level I achieve. If we take these as our premises, the conclusion is that 
living the successfully good human life cannot but be living a life involving care for 
others. This axiological account thus yields a form of umunlu ngumuntu ngabantu that 
should be sufficient to convince even the Immoralist that the good of others is in her 
own interest, if she values any phi/oi. 
221 Love's Knowled&e, OUP, 1990, pl56. 
222 If this claim seems controversial, it is still a conditional - those who do not find philia sufficient to 
motivate pursuing it will not be moved by this argument. I think that psychopaths, as described by 
Singer in Practical Ethics, pp328-330, would probably be unmoved . Singer sees this as a reductio 
against eudaimonist or virtue-oriented models, but the psychopaths' distance from care and the needs 
of others is a problem for any ethical model. It seems to me that being sufficient to convince 11011-
psychopaths to care for others is a reasonable yardstick for any model and my account looks capable of 
that. 
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The Value of Solidarity 
An account like the one I have just presented is possible for any virtue; as with the 
example of health, it is possible to explain the rationality of our commitment to a 
robust virtue by noting how many valuable things depend on it, but this does not tell 
the whole story. What distinguishes Axiological accounts from Game Theory is the 
emphasis on what we find valuable and eudaimonism notes that robust values are 
valuab le not merely because they enable or point toward the valuable, but because 
they are themselves valuable. It is rational to pursue my own health, but it is also 
something I find valuable in itself. In much the same way, while my ph ilia relations 
are supremely valuable, there is also value in directly experiencing what Joseph 
Conrad called 
the subtle, but invincible conviction of so lidarity that knits together the 
loneliness of innumerable hearts: [the 1 solidarity in dreams, in joy, in 
sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in fear, which binds men to 
each other, which binds together all humanity - the dead to the living 
and the living to the unborn ... 22J 
Like being healthy, or being virtuous generally, acting from and contributing 
toward this Conradian sense of solidarity is robustly rewarding in itself. It is unlikely 
that this is a coincidence, since we have already noted the myriad ways in which it is 
most rational, fo r the individual and society, to be other-regarding, there are probably 
sound functionalist evolutionary reasons that we find such activities valuable. But, 
again, this is one thought too many. As Eagleton notes, 
You do not need to find an answer to why human beings live together 
and enjoy each other's company - some of the time, at least. It is in 
their nature to do so. It is a fact about them as animals. But when it 
becomes ' fully ' a fact - when it exists as an activity in itself, not 
simply as a means to an end beyond it - it also becomes a source of 
value.'" 
No eudaimonist account could be complete without noting this inherent value in 
solidarity with others, so strongly emphasised in African philosophical accounts, but 
resting on the value of solidarity alone admits straw-man attacks like Wolfs, and 
cannot convince the Immoralist. As such, I have built my account from the opposite 
m Preface to Tbe Ni~ger oftbe 'Narcissus', Penguin, 1897 (Rpt. 1988) . 
224 After TheO!:}, . pIn. 
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direction, emphasising the necessity of other-directed ness to our flourishing suggested 
by the claim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. The pressure toward other-directed goods 
arises from our shared investment in the general good, that capacity for positive 
appraisal by the community, the opportunity to shift social standards toward other-
directed goods and to maximise our own rationality. In addition, the value of 
solidarity, both in itself and as a necessary condition for ph ilia, compel us to pursue 
the good of others as a necessary part of our own flourishing. As such, the pressure 
toward the good of others generated by assuming Good->Ought is not at odds with 
our own interests, but a necessary part of them. It thus becomes apparent why we 
should not be looking for "moral relaxation."'" Such relaxation would amount to 
relenting in the pursuit of our own most meaningful lives, which hardly sounds as 
appealing. 
Eudaimonia Euthanasia and Minimal Supererogation 
Having established that positive axiological pressure is intrinsic to our interests, 
not opposed to them, I return to the Minimal-Supererogationism left standing at the 
end of Chapter 2. Then it seemed that martyrdom, by virtue of negating our capacity 
to experience any value, is sufficient to negate value-oriented behaviour - but I am not 
convinced that this holds up. It seems to me that our reticence about martyrdom may 
carry less weight than Minimal-Supererogationists think it does, for a number of 
reasons. The first is that a significant amount of our reticence boils down to a 
legitimate squeamishness about crude generalist impositions. We certainly do not 
want to demand of recruits generally that they throw themselves on grenades, always 
and everywhere, but just because we cannot have sufficient information tell any 
specific person that she ought to sacrifice herself, it does not follow that she cannot 
come to a true assessment of the values present in her situation, to the effect that it is 
rational to sacrifice herself. We are not looking for a precedent on which to ground a 
general imperative, but we are looking to establish whether there can be some 
situations in which martyrdom is the rational response. I think that much of the 
squeamishness rightly attached to the first sort of question evaporates when we seek 
to answer the second. 
mSupererogatjoo, p174. 
Of course, we need not cast the situation in generalist terms to find the appeal of 
martyrdom counterintuitive. Thaddeus Metz provides the following Minimal-
Supererogationist example: 
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Suppose that by letting yourself get eaten alive by a lion in a 
particularly drawn-out and gruesome way, you would morally reform 
[an] initially sadistic crowd. That is, they would develop whatever 
virtues you find of importance (compassion, revulsion at what's 
repulsive, whatever). Here, your version of the principle that good 
implies ought entails that you are morally obligated to let the lion eat 
you alive for the sake of developing virtue in others, but, so the 
argument goes, that' s absurd .. . 22' 
At first glance, this example seems convincingly absurd, but this basic description 
also holds true of many paradigmatic instances of "heroic" martyrdom: wasting 
hunger-strikes, self-immolation, and standing down a tank one knows will not stop. 
All ofthese gruesome deaths have been used to bring about some change in the 
collective assessment of unacceptable situations, which was taken as sufficient reason 
by the martyrs concerned. Since it would be begging the question to assert that none 
of these agents were rational, the question of whether any such act can be rational for 
the agent cannot simply rest on the idea that the good of others can entail an 
unpleasant end. Rather, it rests on a far more detailed description of the situation, 
what is at stake and the agent's own unique situation. While actions based on 
underdescribed situations naturally sound absurd, this does not exclude the possibility 
that a fuller description could make the rationality of the action perfectly apparent. 
As the above examples highlight, martyrs tend to be the sorts of people who are 
committed to causes, the sorts of radicals whose political or religious convictions 
drive them to take some issue as their own. Here the Minimal-Supererogationist may 
note the importance of the choice to sacrifice oneself, exemplified in the declaration 
"no slave's unlife shall murder mel for i will freely die,"'" but not all martyrs are 
dedicated political or religious radicals. Take, for example, the man who surrenders 
his place on a sinking ship 's lifeboat so that others may survive, or the ubiquitous 
grenade-stopping recruit. What these people have in common with self-immolating 
226In correspondence. responding to an earlier version afmy second chapter delivered at the Philosophy 
Spring Colloquium, September 11 2005, Rhodes University. 
227 From e.e. cummings' poem Thanksgiving (1956), in Selected Poems 1923 -1958, Penguin, 1960 
(Repr. 1967), p86. The poem refers to the Hungarian Uprising of 1956. 
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monks, or students in Tiananmen Square is not commitment to a cause, but 
responsiveness to a situation. While a passionate political or religious belief is likely 
to focus our attention on the particulars of certain situations in a way uncommon to 
those without it, it is a frequent, not a necessary characteristic of such attention.'" 
However much these responses may address our initial reasons for finding the 
rationality of martyrdom counterintuitive, there is still the central claim of Minimal-
Supererogationism, that Prichard and Williams' integrity claim will always exempt 
martyrdom from being a requirement. That is, that my ongoing capacity to experience 
value at all will always be more valuable to me than any alternative. 
I think there is a significant problem with this claim, in that it treats the agent's 
ongoing existence as a constant value. Eudaimonism, uncontroversially the position 
most pre-occupied with the value of life to the agent, does not make this assumption. 
On a eudaimonist model, we value the overall structure of our lives, but this does not 
entail that our relation to that structure will be the same at every stage, in every 
situation. Our eudaimon te/os is a narrative, its development constrained by our 
personal history and the shifting and contingent opportunities for realising certain 
goals, but not others. We may, for example, have more valuable experiences behind 
us than are likely ahead. Alternatively, our lives so far may have been such that only a 
particularly significant eleventh-hour action could allow us to consider them 
worthwhile (this description probably applies to Sydney Carton in Dickens' A Tale of 
Two Cities"'). 
Here it is important that the narrative structure forces us to weigh realisable 
consequences, not simply realisable goods: [ may well survive, but living in the 
knowledge that I allowed women and children to drown, or an innocent man to go to 
/a guillotine, may not be the sort of life in which I could find much value. Evaluating 
our lives from within the shifting narrative of our eudaimon telos, we are constantly 
re-evaluating the sort of eudaimonia achievable from our current position and no 
values remain fixed. Since we are articulating toward the greater shape of our lives, 
there does not seem to be anything inherently irrational about the idea that willingly 
ending the narrative at a certain point can yield the life of greatest value (since we can 
22KThe recruit, of course, is not really in a position to evaluate very much at all. As such, it is probably 
best at this point to leave him behind, his rhetorical mission accomplished. 
229 Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities Penguin, 1970. 
err either in the excess or the deficiency). That is, there is nothing about articulating 
toward eudaimonia that excludes euthanasia}JU as a constituent of it. 
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Here the Minimal-Supererogationist may interject. This response is slipping away 
from the force of the objection - while I may re-evaluate any particular project in my 
life, it does not follow that I can do the same for living simpliciter. The force of the 
integrity claim is precisely that the only context within which anything can be 
valuable, on a eudaimonist model , is my own experience of it. While I may re-
evaluate and abandon any given project within my experience, I cannot, by definition, 
find anything more valuable than the context in which finding anything at all valuable 
is possible. Martyrdom may well be coherent on a religious model, in which there is 
necessarily a greater context for value than my own life, but a secular ethic does not 
have access to any context greater than the individual 's ongoing valuing of things . 
As we have already seen, there is a sense in which what we value is not limited 
simply to our own lives. Human lives generally, and good lives necessarily, involve 
us in relations of philia, which, as Eagleton noted, "means creating for another the 
kind of space in which he can flourish ... it is to find one 's happiness in being the 
reason for the happiness of another.""1 If our flourishing is realised through the 
flourishing of others, then their continued flourishing can be a coherent goal for us, 
regardless of whether we experience the value generated. This is immediately 
apparent in cases of straightforward sacrifice for those we love: we allow our family 
onto the lifeboat, die for our band of brothers, or go to la guillotine so that our 
inamorata may live a good life. 
Our philoi can be the source of value even in less obvious cases. It seems coherent 
that there may be some situations such that it is reason enough that sacrificing 
ourselves makes the world a better place for those we love . We may stand against the 
advancing tanks so that they live in a less oppressive society, or allow strangers to 
take the lifeboat so that our philoi live in a world that believes in exemplary other-
directed goodness. 
Here it is important to note that life is complicated, offering numerous options for 
realising various goods and it is reasonably rare to find ourselves in the sorts of 
bottleneck from which the greatest realisable good can only be reached by sacrificing 
230 Here I use the term simply in it 's literal sense "the good death" defined relative to the good life. This 
usage probably encompasses the more limited contemporary meaning of the term, but I am not 
addressing that issue directly. 
2lI AfierTbeO!:y. p169. 
ourselves. Legitimate instances may, in fact, be far rarer than the number of martyrs 
seem to suggest. Like any assessment, we can be wrong about the call to martyr 
ourselves, but there seems nothing incoherent about claiming that some legitimate 
instances occur: disasters, conflicts, and grenades happen, and bring with them 
moments which demand extraordinary evaluations. 
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So the situations in which it is rational to sacrifice our lives will be difficult to 
discern, depending on such minute particulars that no general rule could be derived or 
invoked from such instances, but since our eudaimonia cannot but involve the 
eudaimonia of our philoi, and the broader context within which they can flourish, 
there is nothing inherently irrational or incoherent in claiming that such instances 
occur. As such, not even martyrdom is always and everywhere exempt from Good-> 
Ought and not even Minimal-Supererogationism holds. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that our teleological engagement with the world commits us 
significantly to pursuing the general good and the good of others. Though the 
Immoralist may be tempted to exploit the benefits of other-directed behaviour without 
pursuing the good of others herself, a proper understanding of the relation between 
caring for others and realising the flourishing of our philoi casts umunlu ngumuntu 
ngabantu as a corollary to Eudaimonism SimpliCiter. We have reason to pursue the 
flourishing of others, that is, because our own flourishing depends upon it. As such, 
there need not always be a contradiction between self-interest and other-directed 
good, as these frequently coincide. Finally, I have argued that the narrative structure 
of eudaimonia and our commitment to the flourishing of our philoi can allow for 
instances of euthanasia, that is, a context in which martyrdom can be the greatest 
good for the agent. As such, we have no reason to be even Minimal-
Supererogationists. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have argued that we have no reason to be Supererogationists of any 
stripe. I began by noting how counterintuitive we find the Supererogationist claim that 
"there is nothing paradoxical in a good and meritorious action being completely 
optional, even if it is morally better than alternative non-optional actions."'" I spent 
Chapter 1 arguing that this initial strangeness does not fade as we examine the 
concept more deeply. In fact, a closer examination of the deontic presuppositions and 
the ad hoc historical provenance of supererogation provides even more reason to 
doubt the coherence of the concept. 
Although Susan Wolf's and, ultimately, David Heyd's Supererogationist accounts 
cannot provide strong enough reason to allay our discomfort at defining certain goods 
as supererogatory, extant Anti-Supererogationist arguments from Peter Singer and 
K wame Gyekye were not sufficient to scupper Supererogation ism. As such, I sought 
to provide an Anti-Supererogationism capable of responding to Heyd's arguments, 
with sufficient nuance to generate a detailed picture of why we pursue certain goods 
and not others. I began this project in Chapter 2, noting that almost all of the 
justification of Supererogation ism derives from rejections of Good->Ought. One of 
these, the reductio that Good->Ought entails absurd over-obligation, is the basis of 
almost all Supererogationism, while three others were most developed in Heyd 's 
work. I argued for an Anti-Supererogationist position that circumvents these negative 
arguments, while incorporating the benefits they proposed to hold on to through 
supererogation. I concluded Chapter 2 noting that what I call Minimal-
Supererogationism, which argues that only acts of martyrdom arc supererogatory, 
may stand against my account, since such acts seem always to be exempted by 
Bernard Williams ' objection from Integrity. 
Settling the question of Minimal-Supererogation ism, however, depended on the 
proper account of the relation between Axiology and ethical imperatives, and this 
relation was the focus of Chapter 3. Here I argued that Supererogationists must assert 
a naively simplistic account of Axiology for their position to be coherent, and that any 
sufficiently detailed account of the role of Axiological evaluation in ethics leaves the 
category of Supererogation looking incoherent and unnecessary. Examining the 
possibility that a Kantian Virtue Theory accommodating Axiology could still give 
sufficient scope to duty to justify Qualified-Supererogationism, I argued that such a 
m Supererogation, p 165. 
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model cannot answer the Immoralist's question. Since this question must be answered 
and is best answered by Eudaimonism (which is essentially Axiological), a properly 
rigorous account of Axiology should lead us to adopt a fully Anti-Supererogationist 
Eudaimonist Virtue Ethic (thus providing independent reason to pursue the 
eudaimonist line Wolffailed to rule out, discussed in Chapter 1). 
In Chapter 4, I took up the challenge of sketching a detailed account of 
axiologically-derived ethical pressure capable of convincing even the Immoralist of 
the pressure toward other-directed goods. Here I argued that our teleological 
engagement with the world commits us significantly to pursuing the general good and 
the good of others. Though the Immoralist may be tempted to exploit the benefits of 
other-directed behaviour without pursuing the good of others herself, a proper 
understanding of the relation between caring for others and realising the flourishing of 
our philoi casts umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu as a corollary to Eudaimonism 
simpliciter. We have reason to pursue the flourishing of others, that is, because our 
own flourishing depends upon it. As such, there need not always be a contradiction 
between self-interest and other-directed good, as these coincide frequently enough to 
support a eudaimonist picture of the Good. 
Having developed this detailed account of our relation to the valuable, I returned to 
the question of Minimal-Supererogationism. Here I argued that the narrative structure 
of eudaimonia and our commitment to the flourishing of our philoi can allow for 
instances of euthanasia, that is, a context in which martyrdom can be the greatest 
good for the agent. As such, we have no reason to find even acts of martyrdom to be 
categorically beyond the scope of our moral responsibility. 
If, pace Dancy, Supererogationism, and not its refutation, is "one of the positions of 
which Aristotle would say that nobody would hold it except as the result of a theory," 
2J3 then the failure of the theory which supports it should leave us with no reason at all 
to hold it. In addition, a proper recognition of the relation between value and oughts 
generates a strong reason to be positively Anti-Supererogationist. Such a move does 
not negate our autonomy by removing our "right to moral relaxation."'34 Rather, it 
denies strict distinction between our own good and that of others. It reminds us that 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, that our good is caught up with the good of others. If this 
233 Moral Reasons , p 131. 
234 Supererogation, p174. 
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"altruistically-freighted moral ity" 23S requires more of us than Supererogation ism does, 
then that is all to the Good. 
m TraditioD and Modernity, p67. 
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